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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents the development of a new method for incorporating station related 
outages in composite or bulk system reliability analysis. Station related failures can 
cause multiple component outages that can propagate to other parts of the network 
resulting in severe damages. In order to minimize the effects of station related outages 
on the composite system performance it is necessary for the designer to assess their 
effects. This task can be achieved by including station related outages in the composite 
system evaluation.  
 
Monte Carlo simulation is used in this research to assess composite system reliability. 
The new method described in this thesis is used to include station related outages in the 
reliability evaluation of two composite test systems. This new method is relatively 
simple and can be used to consider multiple component outages due to station related 
failures in composite system reliability evaluation. In this approach, the effects of station 
related outages are combined with the connected terminal failure parameters.  
 
Reliability studies conducted on the two composite test systems demonstrates that 
station failures significantly affect the system performance.  The system reliability can 
be improved by selecting appropriate station configurations. This is illustrated by 
application to the two composite test systems. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Modern society is highly dependent on the efficient operation of electric power 
systems and has developed in such a way that even a small interruption in electric power 
supply has a significant effect. Customers expect that electric power should be available 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week without any interruption. The article Power Cuts Can 
Wreck Business April 12, 1999: Fortune Magazine, is ample evidence that illustrates the 
dependence of the world’s advanced nations on electric power supply. In the early days 
of electricity supply, electric power was considered to be a luxury, but today it is a 
highly valued commodity. Although the number of electric power outages in developed 
nations has reduced considerably, developing nations are still coping with the problem 
of frequent power failures. The ability of a power system to provide customers with an 
adequate supply is usually designated by the term “reliability”[1].  
Economic growth is highly dependent on the existence of reliable electricity 
supply at an affordable cost. Major electricity outages can occur due to incorrect 
planning and operation, equipment failures, vandalism, environmental conditions and 
adverse weather effects. The creation and operation of a completely reliable electric 
power system is technically and economically not viable. The practical way to avoid 
major power outages is to make a power system more reliable. This is usually 
accomplished by increasing the system redundancy and the capital investment. 
Increasing the capital investment will result in increased cost to the customer. Therefore 
there has to be a balance between the cost and reliability of an electric power system. 
Power system planners and designers sometimes find it difficult to achieve a balance 
between reliability and cost during the planning phase. Many electric power utilities use 
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both deterministic and probabilistic techniques during the planning phase in order to 
assess power system reliability [2-12]. Probabilistic techniques can be used to 
incorporate a wide range of system behavior and are preferred over deterministic 
techniques [2]. Many probabilistic techniques are now available in the form of computer 
softwares for reliability analysis [5,12].  
There are, however, still many unanswered problems particularly in the new 
deregulated environment and considerable research is in progress to address these issues. 
It is important to consider the vast amount of work that has been done over the last five 
decades [2-12], when considering the problems that face electric power utilities at the 
present time. Some of the basic concepts associated with power system reliability are 
briefly introduced in the following section. 
 
1.2 Brief review of power system reliability evaluation  
Adequacy and security: 
Power system reliability assessment is primarily focused on an analysis of the healthy 
and failure states of a power system. Power system reliability can be subdivided in two 
classes as shown in Figure 1.1 [1,2].  
 
Figure 1.1: System reliability, adequacy and security 
 
Adequacy assessment involves the determination of sufficient facilities within 
the system to satisfy the customer load and deals with static conditions in the power 
system. Power system security is the ability to respond to disturbance arising within the 
system and therefore deals with the dynamic conditions in the system. 
A power system is a complex network and the reliability evaluation of the entire 
configuration is a difficult task. Despite the evaluation complexity, the need for 
 System Reliability 
System Security System Adequacy 
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reliability assessment is ever increasing and more utilities are investing time in 
reliability analysis. In order to reduce the complexity of an overall power system the 
network can be divided into three functional zones as shown in the Figure 1.2. 
These functional zones can be grouped to form three hierarchical levels (HL) for the 
purpose of reliability analysis. Figure 1.2 shows the three hierarchical levels. 
 
 
Hierarchical Level-I involves the generation facilities and deals with the ability of these 
facilities to satisfy the total system load. Hierarchical Level-II involves the combination 
of generation facilities and the transmission system and is designated as the composite or 
bulk system. Reliability assessment at HL-II involves the ability of the composite system 
to satisfy the load requirements at the assigned load points. Hierarchical Level -III 
involves the combination of all the three functional zones. Reliability analysis at HL-III 
is very complex and is rarely done [2]. This thesis deals with adequacy assessment at 
HL-II. The basic concepts are presented in the following section. 
 
1.3 Review of composite system reliability 
Composite system (HL-II or bulk system) reliability evaluation considers both 
the generation and transmission facilities in the analysis and has been defined as follows.  
Generation System 
Transmission System 
Distribution System 
Hierarchical Level-I 
(HL-I) 
Hierarchical Level-II 
(HL-II) 
Hierarchical Level-III 
(HL-III) 
Figure 1.2:  Power system hierarchical levels 
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“Reliability is the degree of assurance of a bulk power supply in delivering 
electricity to major points of distribution.”[1, page 297] 
Reliability evaluation at HL-II is a complex task that involves the analysis of 
generation and transmission contingencies, the modeling of the operating polices 
necessary to order dispatch of generation units, assessment of power flows on 
transmission system components, the alleviation of network violations and load 
shedding if required [1,2].  
Two basic tools i.e. analytical methods and Monte Carlo simulation have been 
extensively utilized for HL-I reliability evaluation. Similar techniques have been applied 
to HL-II evaluation and have been published [14]. The first fundamental developments 
in composite system reliability evaluation were associated with the analytical approach. 
In recent years, the focus has been on the utilization of Monte Carlo simulation in HL-II 
studies. 
Monte Carlo methods were first introduced in the 1940’s for solving 
mathematical problems. Monte Carlo methods simulate the behavior of the system by 
performing a series of experiments [3]. With the recent and rapid development of digital 
computers, Monte Carlo methods have been extensively used for simulating stochastic 
processes. These methods have many advantages over analytical methods in certain 
circumstances and their application to power system reliability is still developing. 
Considerable research is still required in the general area of HL-II evaluation due to 
difficulties encountered with data collection and modeling techniques.  
There are a wide range of HL-II indices that can be calculated using the available 
reliability techniques. These indices can be used to assess the performance at the 
individual load points or for the overall system.  
 
1.4 Predictive indices and past performance indices  
HL-II reliability indices can be divided into the two categories of predictive 
indices and past performance indices [15,16]. Predictive indices provide information on 
the future performance of the system and are important planning parameters. Past 
performance indices indicate the actual system performance and are related to real time 
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operation of the system. Most utilities collect past performance indices in order to assess 
their composite system performance.  
Both analytical techniques and Monte Carlo techniques can be used to calculate 
predictive indices [4]. The concepts associated with Monte Carlo simulation are still 
developing and more research needs to be done to understand and deal with specific 
system problems. System outages can occur due to conditions created by multiple 
component failures.  
These component outages can be categorized as follows [2,17] 
1. independent outages, 
2. dependent outages, 
3. common cause or common mode outages and 
4. station originated outages. 
Data requirements for analyses depend on the kinds of outages considered in the 
analyses. In the real world, all types of component outages occur and therefore 
consideration should be given to them if they affect the system performance.  
The following is a brief discussion on the four major outage types listed above. 
Independent outages:  
This outage event is related to individual component failures and is relatively 
easy to calculate. A simple two state model is usually used to represent a 
component. Most reliability evaluation techniques incorporate independent 
events in contingency evaluations.  
Dependent outages:  
These kinds of outage are dependent on the occurrence of one or more other 
outages and are not normally included in reliability studies. 
Common mode outages:  
These kinds of outage are due to the occurrence of an event that consists of two 
or more simultaneous outages [2]. Common mode outages have relatively high 
probabilities of occurrence and can have a severe effect on the system 
performance. 
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Station outages:  
These outages are caused by the failure of one or more station components. 
Station component outages can have a significant effect on the system 
performance as they can result in the removal from service of generators, 
transmission lines, and other important components.  
Evaluating all HL-II component outages can be a complex activity. A major task in HL-
II reliability evaluation is the determination of the required outage depth when 
evaluating component outages. 
The focus of this thesis is to improve the ability to conduct HL-II evaluation and is 
described in detail in the following section. 
 
1.5 Objective of thesis  
The basic objectives of this thesis are to examine the impact of station related 
failures on composite system reliability and to develop a relatively simple technique to 
include these outages in HL-II reliability evaluation.  
Considerable attention has been given to the inclusion of station related outages 
in composite system reliability evaluation [18-29]. Stations are complicated networks 
and play a very important role in composite system operation. A station can connect 
many transmission lines, generators, reactors etc and is a node where power transfer 
takes place.  
The basic functions of a station are listed below [30], 
1. control the flow of current, 
2. monitor the flow of current, 
3. step up and step down voltage levels, 
4. maintain voltage frequency and 
5. protect system components. 
Stations are also referred to as switching stations or substations in this thesis. In the 
initial stages of composite system reliability evaluation, stations were usually 
represented by a single bus bar. HL-II analysis was a daunting task during the initial 
stages of development due to the need for an exhaustive analytical technique and the 
availability of only minimal computational capability. Station related outages were 
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normally not included in the analyses in the early stages of composite system reliability 
assessment. 
A number of methods for station reliability have been published in the past two 
decades [1,3, 31- 33]. It is difficult to consider station outages within an evaluation of 
HL-II reliability due to station sizes and complexity. Methods have, however, been 
developed to evaluate stations individually and to combine these results in subsequent 
composite system analyses [31].  
These studies clearly indicated the need for further work to accurately represent 
station related outages in composite system reliability assessment. 
In spite of all the attention given to station reliability, stations are difficult to represent in 
an HL-II reliability evaluation. One of the objectives of this research is to develop a 
technique that provides the ability to consider station related outages in HL-II evaluation 
in a simple and realistic manner.  
The HL-II reliability analyses shown in this thesis were conducted using the 
MECORE software. This software was jointly developed by BC-Hydro and the 
University of Saskatchewan and has been used extensively for reliability analysis.  
The next section briefly describes the contents of the subsequent chapters in this thesis.  
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
This thesis contains five chapters. This introductory chapter introduces some of 
the basic concepts in power system reliability evaluation and the objectives of this 
thesis.  
 The basic concepts associated with Monte Carlo simulation are briefly explained 
in Chapter 2. The different types of Monte Carlo simulation and their advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed here. The MECORE software and its application to two 
composite test systems are presented.  
Chapter 3 deals with the development of a new method to include station related 
outages in composite system reliability evaluation. The method is described in detail 
using an example. This method is then used to include station related outages in the 
analyses of the composite test systems. Different types of stations are included in these 
analyses and a range of studies are described in Chapter 3. 
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Sensitivity studies on the reliability of the composite test systems with the 
inclusion of station related outages are presented in Chapter 4. This chapter also shows 
the effect on the composite system reliability of varying the station component failure 
rates. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation Applied to Composite System 
Reliability 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
As described in Chapter 1, the objectives of the research presented in this thesis 
are to investigate the ability to evaluate composite system reliability considering station 
related outages by utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulation can be used 
to simulate the stochastic behavior of a system in situations where the problem is too 
complex to solve manually or with analytical methods. Monte Carlo simulation can be 
applied to processes that behave randomly e.g. tossing of coins, rolling of die etc. Monte 
Carlo simulations are used to solve a wide range of problems.  
 The application of Monte Carlo simulation started in North America. The use of 
Monte Carlo simulation is continually increasing and is becoming a widespread tool in 
system analysis. Monte Carlo simulation has been applied to various problems in nuclear 
engineering, statistical physics, medical sciences, power systems and other fields.  
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to perform a series of experiments to 
simulate the behavior of a power system. The simulations utilize random number 
generators and probabilistic techniques to solve problems associated with stochastic 
processes. During the last two decades, many attempts have been made to apply Monte 
Carlo simulation to evaluate power system reliability. Power systems usually have very 
complex and large networks and in these situations reliability evaluation with Monte 
Carlo simulation can be a difficult task [1,2] and requires large amounts of computer 
storage and computing time. The recent development of high-speed computers with 
large storage has made the application of Monte Carlo simulation a much easier task. 
Monte Carlo simulation has been used successfully for reliability evaluation at HL-I and 
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HL-II. This chapter describes the basic concepts of Monte Carlo simulation and its 
application to reliability evaluation of composite power systems (HL-II).  
 
2.2. Monte Carlo simulation process: A review  
The basic task of a Monte Carlo simulation application is to examine and predict 
the real behavior patterns for a stochastic system [3]. In power system reliability 
evaluation, the output of a Monte Carlo simulation is usually the frequency or 
probability distributions of various reliability parameters. A vital part of Monte Carlo 
simulation is the random number generation [3]. Random numbers are created using 
digital computers and are usually normalized to lie between 0 and 1. These random 
numbers are called pseudo-random numbers because they would be repeated given a 
sufficiently long period. These random numbers can be converted using appropriate 
distribution functions before utilization in the simulation process. A Monte Carlo 
stimulation should be terminated when the results are sufficiently close to the actual 
values. The procedure for stopping a Monte Carlo simulation involves convergence 
analysis. Monte Carlo simulation creates a fluctuating convergence process as shown in 
Figure 2.1 [3]. 
The stopping criteria for Monte Carlo simulation usually use the coefficient of 
variation of the output. Many different indices are obtained in a power system reliability 
evaluation using Monte Carlo stimulation. All indices have different speed of 
convergence characteristics and it is usual to select one index as an indicator for 
Figure 2.1: Fluctuating convergence 
Number of samples 
True value 
0 
Estimated value 
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convergence. Based on past experience, the Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) 
index has the lowest speed of convergence and is usually used as the convergence 
indicator [33]. 
Monte Carlo simulation processes differ based on the techniques used for 
random number generation, the convergence criteria, the method used to achieve 
convergence and the different sampling approaches. Monte Carlo simulation techniques 
can be classified into the two categories of sequential and non-sequential methods. 
Sequential evaluation involves a chronological analysis of the system and component 
states. The chronology is absent in the case of non-sequential analysis. Non-sequential 
techniques are widely used for power system reliability evaluation and can be divided in 
the two categories of state sampling and state transition sampling.  These techniques are 
described in the following sections. 
 
Non-Sequential Methods: State Sampling Approach  
 
In this approach, the system state is obtained by sampling all component states 
irrespective of the event chronologies [3]. A random number generator is used to 
determine the behavior of the component states [up, down]. The state sampling method 
is used to calculate the probability of occurrence of every system state in addition to the 
component states [3]. The following steps describe the process of this method. 
1. Each system state is sampled using the component state sampling 
method. The component states are obtained by generating a random number and 
comparing it with the component forced unavailability. The component states are 
combined to determine the system state. 
2. If the system state is predicted as an abnormal state, then load curtailment 
occurs; otherwise the next state is sampled. 
3. If load curtailment is required, action is taken to determine the extent and 
the location. 
4. The desired adequacy indices are calculated and stored and steps 1 to 3 
are repeated until the coefficient of variation of a specified index is less than the 
criterion value. 
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A major disadvantage of this method is that it cannot be used to obtain a very accurate 
frequency index. 
 
Non-Sequential Methods: State Transition Sampling Approach 
This method can be used to calculate accurate frequency indices as it uses the system 
state transitions and not the component states to calculate the system indices. In this 
method the state transition of any component leads to a system state transition. The 
following steps describe the working process of this method [3]. 
1. The normal system is the first system state in the state transition sampling 
method. This is the state in which all the system components are in the up state. 
2. The state transition of any component may lead to a system state transition. The 
state transition of any component is determined by random number generation. If 
the present system state is a contingency state in which at least one component is 
on outage, then load curtailment occurs. Otherwise the next sample is 
considered. 
3. A long system state transition sequence is required to evaluate the indices of each 
system state. 
4. The simulation is stopped when the coefficient of variation is less than the 
criterion value.  
This procedure requires more time than the basic state sampling approach described 
earlier. 
 
Sequential Methods: State Duration Sampling Approach  
In this method, the process generates the chronological state transitions for all the 
components. The chronological system state transitions are generated from the 
component state sequences using their state duration distribution functions. All types of 
distribution functions can be used in the state duration sampling method. The procedure 
used for reliability evaluation is as follows [3] 
1. The initial state of components (up or down) is assumed. 
2. The chronological sequences of states for each component are determined. 
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3. The chronological sequence system state is obtained by combining the 
chronological component states.  
4. System analysis is conducted on the obtained system states to produce the 
desired reliability indices. 
5. Steps (1-5) are repeated until the coefficient of variation for a specified index is 
less than the criterion value. 
This method can be used to obtain accurate frequency indices. A major disadvantage 
is that it requires more computation time and computer memory than the non-
sequential techniques. This method requires all the parameters associated with the 
component state duration distributions as input.  
  
2.3. Composite system (HL-II) adequacy evaluation using Monte Carlo  
       simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation methods described above can be and have been 
applied to composite system reliability assessment. In these applications, load flow 
calculations, contingency analysis, generation rescheduling and overload alleviation 
involve considerable calculation time and hence non-sequential methods are preferred as 
they involve less computing time and memory. Monte Carlo simulation has been 
extensively applied to evaluate HL-II reliability.  
Commercial softwares such as CREAM (Developed by EPRI, USA),  
MECORE (Developed at the University of Saskatchewan and then at BC Hydro, 
Canada) NARP (Developed by ERCOT, USA) SICRET (Developed by ENEL, Italy) 
and NH2 (developed by CEPEL, Brazil) use Monte Carlo simulation [44, 31] for 
evaluating composite power system reliability. The MECORE software was used in the 
research presented in this thesis and is described in the next section of this chapter. 
 
MECORE software review  
The MECORE software is based on a combination of Monte Carlo simulation 
and the enumeration technique. Monte Carlo simulation is conducted using the basic 
state sampling technique. [3,13] 
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The basic tasks involved in composite system reliability evaluation are  
1. load flow calculations (DC load flow), 
2. contingency analysis, 
3. generation rescheduling and 
4. overload alleviation. 
The system states can be divided into the four subsets S1, S2, S3, and S4 and are 
displayed below [3]. 
 
 
 
 S  
      
              
       
             
 
 
 
Where, 
S1 - Normal state subset with no contingencies 
S2 - Subset composed of the contingency states which definitely have no load              
        curtailment 
S3 - Subset composed of contingency states, which have no load curtailment  
        after rescheduling the generation 
S4 - Subset composed of the contingency states, which still have load curtailment  
        after rescheduling the generation 
S1 - Contingency subset 
S2 - Subset composed of the contingency states, which may have load  
        curtailment. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
S4 
S1 
S1 
S2 
S2 
S3
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The basic internal procedures in MECORE are shown in the Table 2.1, which shows that 
system states are evaluated further to segregate the unreliability subsets from the healthy 
system states. 
Table 2.1: System state classification [3] 
 
System 
State Load curtailment Contingency 
Rescheduling 
of generators Further steps 
S1 No action No action No action  
 
S1 No action Action No action 
 
S2 or S2 
S2 No action Action No action  
 
S2 Action Action No action 
Reschedule generation 
and determine 
curtailed load, using 
minimization model 
S3 No action Action Action 
If the resulting load 
curtailed is 0 then go 
to state S3, else S4 
S4 Action Action Action Unreliability subset 
 
Convergence of Monte Carlo simulation   
As mentioned in Section 2.2, Monte Carlo simulation is a fluctuating process and 
the speed of convergence depends on the accuracy requirements and the computer CPU. 
The index Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) is often used as the convergence 
indicator. The EENS has the lowest convergence rate compared to other indices. The 
convergence criteria in these studies are the expected tolerance of ± 1 % in the variance 
of the EENS at the load buses and the system EENS coefficient of variation to be 0.02 to 
0.1. The simulation proceeds until the desired convergence is achieved. As noted earlier, 
the rate of convergence is different for different indices. It also varies for the bus and the 
system index values. 
 
MECORE capabilities 
System Size: 
The MECORE software is structured as follows [13]. 
Maximum buses: 1000 
Maximum Branches: 2000 
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The MECORE installation guide recommends that a user should limit the size of the 
system to 200-300 buses for fast system solutions. Other capabilities of the MECORE 
software are as follows [13]. 
Component failure modes: 
1. Independent failures of generators, lines and transformers 
2. Common cause outages of transmission lines 
3. Generating unit derated states 
Component failure criteria: 
1. Capacity deficiency of generators  
2. Line overload 
3. System separation-load loss 
4. Bus isolation-load loss 
Load models: 
1. Annual, seasonal and monthly load curves. 
2. Multi step models. 
3. Bus load proportional scaling and flat level model. 
Methods used to perform calculations: 
1. Monte Carlo simulation and enumeration technique: 
2. DC load flow: 
3. Fast contingency analysis 
4. Linear programming optimization model 
5. Rescheduling/remedial action 
6. Load curtailment philosophies 
7. Reliability index evaluation 
Task that can be performed using MECORE: 
1. Power system reliability evaluation 
2. System interruption cost assessment  
3. Least cost probabilistic planning 
4. Sensitivity analysis of generator location and size 
5. Impact of Priority of loads or practices of load shedding 
6. Reliability centered maintenance scheduling 
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Reliability indices evaluated by MECORE 
The load bus and system indices evaluated by the MECORE software are abbreviated as 
follows [2,13].  
Load Bus Indices: 
ENLC  Expected Number of Load Curtailments (1/yr) 
PLC   Probability of Load Curtailment 
ELC   Expected Load Curtailment (MW/year) 
EDNS   Expected Demand Not Supplied (MW) 
EENS  Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWhr /year) 
System Indices: 
ENLC   Expected Number of Load Curtailments (1/year) 
ADLC  Average Duration of Load Curtailment (hrs/disturbance) 
EDLC   Expected Duration of Load Curtailment (hrs/year) 
PLC   Probability of Load Curtailment 
EDNS  Expected Demand Not Supplied (MW) 
EENS  Expected Energy Not Supplied (MWhr /year) 
EDC   Expected Damage Cost (k$/year) 
BPII  Bulk Power Interruption Index (MW/MW-year) 
BPECI  Bulk Power Energy Curtailment Index (MWhr/MW-year) 
BPACI Bulk Power supply Average Curtailment Index     
(MW/ disturbance) 
MBECI           Modified Bulk Energy Curtailment Index (MW/disturbance) 
SI                    Severity Index (system minutes/year) 
If these indices are calculated using a single load level expressed on a yearly basis then 
they are designated as annualized indices and if the indices are calculated using a load 
duration curve expressed on a yearly basis then they are designated as annual indices. 
The reliability indices are also calculated for the system and for the individual load 
points. The load or delivery point is the point of supply where the energy from the bulk 
electric system is transferred to the distribution system or to the retail customers [34]. 
This point is generally taken as the low voltage bus bar at step-down transformer 
stations. For customer owned stations supplied directly from the transmission system, 
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this point is generally taken as the interface between the utility owned equipment (load 
transformer) and the customer’s equipment [34]. The annual indices obtained from 
MECORE are used to evaluate composite system performance in this thesis. 
 
Input data for MECORE  
 MECORE accepts formatted text files as an input and gives a formatted text file 
output. If there are any formatting errors in the input field format they can cause 
abnormal system conditions, and an interruption occurs in the simulation process.  Data 
file processing done by MECORE is represented in Figure 2.2 [13]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Data file processing for MECORE 
 
The input file can be generated by PSS/E (PTI format) software or in the form of a 
specified text input known as the BC-Hydro format. The results obtained using the BC-
Hydro and PTI format input files are similar. The analysis in this research was done 
using the BC-Hydro format input file.  
 
 
 
Additional data for 
simulation procured 
through manual 
entry based on I/P 
file 
Manual entry of various 
options  
Input 
 text file 
*.raw 
Output 
text file 
*.o 
Termination or 
generation of 
error file 
MECORE 
simulation 
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2.4. Composite test systems 
Two test systems have been utilized in this research. They are the Institution of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Reliability Test System-IEEE-RTS [35] and the 
Roy Billinton Test System-RBTS [36].The single line diagrams of the basic RBTS and 
the IEEE-RTS are shown in Figures 2.3  and  2.4 respectively. 
 G G
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1 6 
3 
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2 7 
5 8 
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Figure 2.3: Single line diagram of the RBTS 
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Figure 2.4: Single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS  
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The basic elements in the two test systems are shown in Table 2.2. The basic test system 
data are given in Appendix A (RBTS) and Appendix B (IEEE-RTS). 
 
Table 2.2: Composite test systems composition 
 
 RBTS[36] IEEE-RTS [35] 
No. of buses 6 24 
No. of generators 11 32 
No. of loads 5 17 
No of generation buses 2 11 
Installed generation  240 MW 3405 MW 
Total load  185 MW 2850 MW 
No. of circuits 9 38 
No. of branches 7 34 
 
The RBTS was developed at the University of Saskatchewan and is a small 
published test system developed for education and research purposes. The RBTS has 
been used to test the new method developed to include station related outages.  
The IEEE-RTS is comparatively much bigger than the RBTS and has a strong 
transmission system and a weak generation system. The IEEE-RTS was first published 
in 1979 and since then has been extensively used for testing new reliability techniques 
and softwares. The IEEE-RTS is used as a secondary system to test the new method 
developed for including station related outages.  
The basic single line diagrams of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS shown in Figures 
2.3 and 2.4 have been extended to include further detail and are shown in Figures 2.5 
and 2.6 respectively. In these figures, each generating unit in a station is shown 
seperately with the associated step up transformer. 
 
2.5. Convergence analysis of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS 
It is necessary to consider a sufficient number of samples in order to obtain accurate 
reliability indices using a simulation tool such as MECORE. The solution convergence 
is independent of the size of the system. The coefficient of variation of the output can 
also be used as a convergence indicator and should be between 0.02 and 0.1. [13] The 
coefficient of variation of the EENS is used in these studies in order to achieve 
acceptable accuracy.  
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Figure 2.5: Extended single line diagram of the RBTS 
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Figure 2.6: Extended single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS 
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The MECORE software calculates the coefficient of variation for the system EDNS. 
This index is directly related to the system EENS. The number of samples required for 
each MECORE simulation can also be decided from the variance in the EENS [3]. A 1% 
variance criterion was used to obtain the convergence. The next section illustrates  the 
convergence characteristics of the RBTS (Figure 2.5 ) and the IEEE-RTS ( Figure 2.6). 
 
Convergence of the RBTS  
A total number of 2,000,000 samples were required to obtain a variance of 1% or 
less in the EENS values at the selected load buses for the extended RBTS shown in 
Figure 2.5. It can be observed from Figure 2.7 that the selected load bus indices are 
below 1% at 2,000,000 simulations. Load buses 4 and 5 have a very low value of EENS 
and their rate of convergence is slow. The system indices converge faster compared to 
the load bus indices. The system EENS coefficient of variation is 0.082, which is less 
than 0.1. 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 RBTS convergence  
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Convergence of the IEEE-RTS  
A total of 500,000 samples were used to obtain a variance less than 1% for the extended 
IEEE-RTS shown in Figure 2.6.  The variation in the EENS values at selected load buses 
is shown in Figure 2.8. In this case the coefficient of variation is 0.071, which is less 
than 0.1. 
  
 
 
2.6. Base case reliability analysis 
The test systems used for the reliability analyses discussed in this section are shown in 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6.   
 
Analysis of the RBTS 
The RBTS shown in Figure 2.5 is considered to be the base case representation in this 
research. Load curtailment due to overload conditions is based on the economic impact 
of these actions at various load buses [2,13]. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: IEEE-RTS convergence  
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IEAR values and priority order of load curtailment:  
A priority order based on the IEAR (Interrupted Energy Assesment Rate) was used for 
load curtailment ranking. The IEAR is the average monetary impact on the customers at 
a load point, expressed in dollars per kW/h of unserved energy. The higher the IEAR the 
higher is the service priority at that bus. It can be observed from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 that 
load bus 2 has the highest priority as it has the highest IEAR. The overall system IEAR 
is 4.42$/kWh. 
 
 
 
Load Bus IEAR ($/kWh) Priority order Load Bus 
2 7.41 1 2 
3 2.69 2 4 
4 6.78 3 5 
5 4.82 4 6 
6 3.63 
 
5 3 
 
The RBTS reliability indices are shown in the following section. 
 
RBTS reliability indices: 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the load bus and system indices for the RBTS. There is 
a wide range of reliability indices shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Each index provides 
different information and some indices are more important than others. The load point 
indices are useful in assessing the load point impact of system modifications and provide 
input to reliability evaluation at the actual customer level. The system indices provide 
valuable information on the overall ability of the system to supply the customer load. 
The likelihood of a customer receiving uninterrupted power supply can be assessed from 
the indices of Table 2.5. The higher the value of the reliability indices the higher is the 
unreliability at the corresponding bus. Load bus 6 has the highest reliability indices as it 
is connected through a radial transmission line, making it relatively more unreliable. 
Load bus 3 has comparatively high reliability indices because it has the lowest load 
curtailment priority.  
 
 
Table 2.3: Load bus IEAR for    
                 the RBTS 
Table 2.4: Load bus priority  
                  order for the RBTS 
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Table 2.5: Load bus indices for the RBTS  
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.000 Bus 2 
3 0.00019 0.10699 1.229 0.00212 18.580 Bus 3 
4 0.00000 0.00103 0.00700 0.00000 0.031 Bus 4 
5 0.00000 0.00549 0.05900 0.00003 0.289 Bus 5 
6 0.00121 1.18785 15.1590 0.01538 134.744  Bus 6 
 
Table 2.6: System indices for the RBTS  
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.28996 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.47 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 12.21 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.00139 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.01754 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 153.64 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 679.10                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.08894 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.83051 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
12.76 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00009 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 49.83 
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Analysis of the IEEE-RTS 
The IEAR values used for the load buses of the IEEE-RTS are shown in Table 2.7 
[2,33]. The corresponding priority orders used for load curtailment are shown in Table 
2.8. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IEEE-RTS Reliability Indices: 
This section deals with the analysis of the IEEE-RTS shown in Figure 2.6. The 
reliability indices shown are evaluated using the load curve given in [35]. The IEEE-
RTS load bus and system indices are shown in Tables 2.9 and 2.10.  
 
Load bus Indices: 
It can be seen from Table 2.9 that the reliability indices at load bus 19 are relatively high 
as this load bus has the lowest load curtailment priority. The major contributions to the 
IEEE-RTS reliability indices are due to the weak generation system.  
 
 
 
Load Bus IEAR ($/kWh) 
1 6.20 
2 4.89 
3 5.30 
4 5.62 
5 6.11 
6 5.50 
7 5.41 
8 5.40 
9 2.30 
10 4.14 
13 5.39 
14 3.41 
15 3.01 
16 3.54 
18 3.75 
19 2.29 
20 3.64 
Priority order Load Bus 
1 1 
2 5 
3 4 
4  6 
5  7 
6  8 
7 13  
8  3 
9  2 
10 10 
11 18 
12 20 
13 16 
14 14 
15 15 
16  9 
 17 19 
Table 2.7: Load bus IEAR 
                  for the IEEE -RTS   
Table 2.8: Load bus priority order 
                  for the IEEE-RTS 
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Table 2.9: Load bus indices for the IEEE-RTS  
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
1 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus 1 
2 0.00000 0.00131 0.047 0.00004 0.344 Bus 2 
3 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus 3 
4 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus 4 
5 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus 5 
6 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus 6 
7 0.00000 0.00047 0.004 0.00000 0.020 Bus 7 
8 0.00000 0.00009 0.001 0.00000 0.004 Bus 8 
9 0.00111 0.91583 56.674 0.06865 601.401 Bus 9 
10 0.00000 0.00496 0.276 0.00025 2.177 Bus 10 
13 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 Bus13 
14 0.00020 0.18238 11.033 0.01217 106.585 Bus14 
15 0.00066 0.54787 47.0245 0.05499 481.729 Bus15 
16 0.00009 0.08377 3.190 0.00344 30.093 Bus16 
18 0.00003 0.03012 2.315 0.00230 20.147 Bus18 
19 0.00199 1.60393 101.608 0.12721 1114.373 Bus19 
 20 0.00006 0.05504 2.448 0.00252 22.086 Bus 20 
 
 
Table 2.10: System indices for the IEEE-RTS  
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.60450 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 10.89 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 17.47 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.00199 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.27157 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 2378.95 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 10039.18 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.07889 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.83472 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
140.13 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00010 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 50.08 
 
The EDC index in Table 2.10 is calculated using an IEAR of 4.22 $/kWh. 
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2.7. Composite test systems with load point transformers  
Figure 2.9 shows a further extended RBTS that includes step down transformers  
at each load point. As noted earlier, Reference 34 states that the load or delivery points 
in a bulk system are the points of supply where the energy from the bulk system is 
transfered to the distribution system or to the retail customers. In the diagram shown in 
Figure 2.9, the transformers are assumed to be owned by the utility. The load point 
transformer failure data is given in Appendix B (Table B-7). It is assumed that only one 
transformer is present at every load bus. This may not be the case in practice and this 
assumption gives pessimistic results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Extended single line diagram of the RBTS with load point transformers 
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The effect of including transformers is minimized by providing redundant or standby 
transformers. 
 
Analysis of the RBTS with load point transformers 
 
The single line diagram of the RBTS with load point transformers is shown in 
Figure 2.9. The load bus and system indices are shown in Tables 2.11 and 2.12. This 
analysis shows that load bus 17 has the maximum EENS. This load point has the 
maximum load and the lowest load curtailment priority. Load bus 20 has the second 
highest EENS because it is connected by a radial transmission line. The system indices 
show a significant increase from those in Table 2.6 due to the inclusion in the reliability 
analysis of the load point transformers. 
 
Table 2.11: Load bus indices for the RBTS with load point transformers 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00175   0.21880      2.799   0.02240     196.224   Bus 16 
17 0.00197   0.33909     13.887   0.09880     865.449   Bus 17 
18 0.00178   0.23194      5.915   0.04558     399.315   Bus 18 
19 0.00175   0.23431      2.986   0.02232     195.561   Bus 19 
20 0.00300   1.41311     17.957   0.03829     335.433   Bus 20 
 
Table 2.12: System indices for the RBTS with load point transformers 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.42 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 37.00 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 89.40 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.01021 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.22740 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 1991.98 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 8804.56                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.23537 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 10.77 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
18.02 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00123 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 646.05 
  
The extended single line diagram for the IEEE-RTS is shown in Figure 2.10 
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Figure 2.10: Extended single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS with load point           
                   transformers 
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Analysis of the IEEE-RTS with load point transformers 
The IEEE-RTS with load point transformers is shown in Figure 2.10. The load bus 
indices and system indices shown in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 increase due to incorporating 
the load point transformers. Load bus 62 connected to bus 19 shows the highest value of 
the EENS as it has the lowest load curtailment priority.  
 
Table 2.13: Load bus indices for the IEEE-RTS with load point transformers 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
29 0.00171 0.88195 60.926 .11785 1032.378 Bus29 
34 0.00168 0.89028 54.966 0.10414 912.283 Bus34 
35 0.00172 0.92045 105.975 0.19757 1730.717 Bus35 
36 0.00181 0.94722 44.835 0.08558 749.663 Bus36 
37 0.00168 0.90622 41.155 0.07648 669.941 Bus37 
38 0.00173 0.90505 78.731 0.15084 1321.368 Bus38 
39 0.00176 0.93253 74.526 0.14088 1234.126 Bus39 
43 0.00185 0.98056 107.243 0.20213 1770.661 Bus43 
44 0.00462 3.14052 236.220 0.36628 3208.585 Bus44 
45 0.00179 0.94321 115.934 0.22168 1941.893 Bus45 
49 0.00180 0.94842 160.761 0.30443 2666.787 Bus49 
50 0.00238 1.45258 149.458 0.25761 2256.698 Bus50 
51 0.00343 2.25026 305.643 0.50442 4418.740 Bus51 
59 0.00202 1.16604 68.282 0.12203 1068.983 Bus59 
61 0.00187 1.02702 205.371 0.38462 3369.313 Bus61 
62 0.00656 4.55551 344.494 0.51841 4541.292 Bus62 
63 0.00198 1.10042 83.488 0.15463 1354.596 Bus63 
 
Table 2.14: System indices for the IEEE-RTS with load point transformers 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 18.97 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 15.69 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 297.65 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.03398 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 3.91 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 34247.86 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 144525.97 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.78527 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 12.02 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
117.96 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00137 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 721.01 
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2.8  Summary   
This chapter briefly illustrates the application of Monte Carlo simulation to 
composite system reliability evaluation. The various Monte Carlo methods used for 
reliability analysis are also briefly described.  
The MECORE software used for composite system reliability analysis is briefly 
illustrated in this chapter. Details on the capabilities of the MECORE software and the 
various reliability indices obtained using the MECORE software are also presented. 
The composite test systems (RBTS and IEEE-RTS) used for reliability studies in 
the research are also presented. The composite systems were modified to include the 
station transformers and are shown in the extended single line diagrams. The simulation 
convergence characteristics of the two test systems are illustrated and the convergence 
criteria applied in the studies described in this thesis are defined. 
Base case reliability analyses of the composite test systems are also presented in 
this chapter. The base case indices are used for comparison purpose throughout this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Composite System Evaluation with Station Related Outages  
 
3.1 Introduction 
A composite system normally has many stations within it and therefore the 
availability of power supply to the customer depends on the proper functioning of the 
station components. The influence of station failures on the power system performance 
can be appreciated from an event that was described on the BBC News, Monday 
October 14th, 2002, Power cut: Most of the Oxfordshire in the dark as the Cowley 
substation went down on Sunday evening. This event shows that the effect of faults that 
occur in a station can spread to other parts of a power system and can cause severe 
damages. Station faults can reduce the total system transfer capacity and affects the 
electricity supply to the customers. Minimizing the effects of station related outages on 
the composite system reliability is an important planning activity. Stations consist of 
components such as circuit breakers, bus bars, disconnects etc and have a range of 
possible configurations. A designer may decide to select a more reliable station 
configuration for a given set of components after assessing the effects of station related 
outages in an HL-II reliability study. This activity is a difficult task. 
Collection of station component outages data is an important activity and is 
described in detail in this chapter. The composite test systems RBTS and IEEE-RTS 
presented in Chapter 2 are modified to include different station configurations in order to 
study the effects of station failures on the HL-II performance.  This chapter describes a 
new technique that can be used to include station related outages in the analysis. 
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3.2 Station component failures and outages  
Stations consist of components such as circuit breakers, bus bars, transformers 
and disconnects that are susceptible to failure when in operation. In order to understand 
the effects of station component failures on the system performance it is necessary to 
study the station component outage processes. In this research work the focus is on 
permanent outages of station components and maintenance outages are not considered. 
“A permanent outage is an outage whose cause if not self clearing, but must be corrected 
by eliminating the hazard or by repairing or by replacing the component before it can be 
returned to service” [31]. System components may be removed from service due to the 
outage of a station component. A failed station component is brought back to service by 
repair or by replacing the component. If a component is removed from service due to 
failures in other external devices then the time required to bring the component back into 
service is known as the switching time. The processes of component failure, repair and 
switching are used to model the component in discrete and identifiable states that are 
continuous in time. The usual method to represent a component in continuous discrete 
states is known as a continuous Markov process [38]. Important station components such 
as circuit breakers, bus bars and transformers are modeled using Markov processes. 
These models are then used to incorporate station related outages in the HL-II 
evaluation.  
 
Basic Markov model for a single component  
The continuous Markov process for a component with two states can be modeled 
as shown in Figure 3.1[38].  
 
 
State 0 
 
Component 
operating 
State 1 
 
Component 
failed 
λ (failure rate) 
µ (repair rate) 
Figure 3.1: A component two state space diagram 
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A continuous Markov process is a specific stochastic process that is independent of all 
the past states except the immediately preceding one. The probability of failure or repair 
for a fixed interval of time is constant in a continuous Markov process. Power system 
components can be represented by discrete system states with constant transition rates 
between these states. In Figure 3.1, “State 0” represents the healthy state of the 
component and the component is in an operating condition. The component when it 
cannot perform its intended function is in “State 1” or the failed state. Transitions occur 
between “State 0” and “State 1”. The transition rates between the states are the failure 
rate “λ” and the repair rate “µ” and are shown in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 shows the two 
states in terms of the average residence time in each state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where,  
m is the mean operating time of the component, 
r is the mean repair time of the component, 
T is the system cycle time. 
In Figure 3.2, “m” is also known as the mean time to failure (MTTF) and “r” is 
the mean time to repair (MTTR). The summation of MTTF and MTTR is the mean time 
between failures (MTBF) or the cycle time “T”.  
Equations 3.1 to 3.3 show the relationship between the transition rates and the transition 
times shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
m = MTTF = 1/λ        (3.1) 
r  = MTTR = 1/µ        (3.2) 
T = MTBF = m + r = 1/frequency     (3.3) 
Operating 
 
Time T 
r m
Figure 3.2: Mean time diagram for a two state component 
Failed 
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The steady state probabilities of residing in the operating state (State 0) and the 
failed state (State 1) are designated as P0 and P1 respectively. Equations 3.4 and 3.5 can 
be used to calculate these probabilities [38]. 
 
        P0             =         =                (3.4) 
 
              P1     =  =         (3.5) 
 
The component Markov representation shown in Figure 3.1 is used to model a number 
of station components. In some cases a component may have more than two states as 
shown in the following examples. 
 
Markov model for a circuit breaker  
Circuit breakers are switching devices that play an important role in power 
system operation. According to the American National Standards Association (ANSI) 
C37.100 a circuit breaker is defined as,  
“A mechanical device capable of making, carrying and breaking currents under 
normal circuit conditions and also making, carrying for a specific time and breaking 
currents under specified abnormal circuit conditions such as those of short circuit” [30]. 
A circuit breaker is intended for interrupting current. Breakers failures can result 
in severe damage to a power system and reduces its power transfer capacity. A model 
for a circuit breaker is shown in Figure 3.3. This Markov model includes both active and 
passive failures. These two modes of circuit breaker failures are defined as follows 
Passive failure: A component failure mode that does not cause operation of a protection 
breaker and therefore does not have an impact on the remaining healthy components. 
Repairing or replacing the failed component restores the service [2]. 
Active failure: A component failure mode that causes the operation of the primary zone 
around the failed component and can therefore cause the removal of other healthy 
components and branches from service. After an active circuit breaker failure occurs the 
circuit breaker is isolated with the help of other protection breakers [2].  
 
m
m + r 
r 
m + r 
λ 
λ + µ 
µ 
λ + µ 
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The rate of transition from “State 0” to “State 1” is the active failure rate (λa) and 
the rate of transition from “State 0” to “State 2” is the passive failure rate (λp). The rate 
of transition from “State 1” to “State 2” is the switching rate (µsw) and is the reciprocal 
of the time required to switch out a circuit breaker with an active failure. The transition 
rate (µ) from “State 2” to “State 0” is the repair rate of a circuit breaker and is the 
reciprocal of the time required to bring a passively failed breaker into service. 
 
Markov model for a bus section  
Bus sections are used to connect system components. A bus section is defined as 
a set of conductors to which two or more components are electrically connected [40]. 
Generally the frequency of bus bar failures is relatively low when compared to circuit 
breaker failures, because their operation is independent of any switching actions.  
System operation can be severely affected by bus bar failures. A Markov model used to 
represent a bus bar is shown in Figure 3.4 and has the same structure as the model in 
Figure 3.1. The transition rate from “State 0” to “State 1” is known as the failure rate 
(λb) and the transition rate from “State 1” to “State 0” is known as the repair rate (µb). 
Figure 3.3: A circuit breaker state space diagram 
State 0 
Circuit 
breaker 
operating 
State 1 
 
Active 
failure 
λa 
State 2 
Switched 
out circuit 
breaker 
λp µ
 
µsw 
State 0 
 
Bus bar 
operating 
State 1 
 
Bus bar 
failed 
λb 
µb 
Figure 3.4: A bus bar state space diagram 
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Markov model for a transformer  
A transformer is used to step up or step down the voltage levels in a power 
system network. Transformers are normally located at the generation or at the load 
points in a power system. The state space diagram for a transformer is shown in Figure 
3.5 [31,40]. The terms λt designate the transformer failure rate and the term µt represents 
the repair rate. The average repair time for a transformer is usually very high compared 
to that of other station components.  
 
 
Markov model for station related multiple component outages  
In some cases, station component failures can result in the simultaneous removal 
from service of two or more station connected devices. This event is designated as a 
station related outage. Figure 3.6 shows a Markov model of this type of event. This 
model is similar in form to that used to represent a common mode outage of two 
components. The rate of departure from “State 0”to “State 4” is the common failure rate 
(λ12) and the rate of departure from “State 4” to “State 0” is the common repair rate 
(µ12). The failure rates λ1 and λ2 and the repair rates µ1 and µ2 are related to the 
components 1 and 2 respectively. When the station failure causing a common outage 
(State 4) is removed, the two disconnected station connected components can be 
returned to service (State 0). The parameter µ12 in Figure 3.6 is the switching rate. 
State 0 
 
Transformer 
operating 
State 1 
 
Transformer 
failed 
λt 
µt 
Figure 3.5: A transformer state space diagram 
 41 
 
The Markov process can become complicated with increase in the number of station-
connected components affected by a station component failure. The Markov models 
shown in Figure 3.3 to 3.6 for station components were used in the development of the 
new technique for including station outages in HL-II evaluation described in the next 
section. 
 
3.3 A new method for representing station related outages 
In order to assess the effects of station related outages on HL-II performance it is 
necessary to represent stations in detail.  Station related outages can affect all the 
incoming and outgoing power system connections. One way to include the station 
related outages in an HL-II analysis is to incorporate station related effects into the 
failure parameters of the connected system components [32]. A new approach to 
accomplish this task using minimal cut sets is illustrated as follows using the ring bus 
scheme example shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Outage of two system components caused by a station component  
                    failure 
    
State 1 
1 Failed 
2 Operating 
State 0 
1 Operating 
2 Operating 
State 3 
1 Failed 
2 Failed 
State 2 
1 Operating 
2 Failed 
State 4 
1 Failed 
2 Failed 
(Station related 
outages) 
λ1 
µ1 
λ2 λ1 
λ2 
µ2 
µ2 
µ2 
λ12 µ12 
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The terminals shown in the Figure 3.7 can be either load points, transmission 
lines or incoming feeders. The following steps explain the method. 
  
Step 1: The minimal cut sets related to station component outages that cause failure of 
one terminal are determined. These minimal cut sets include both active and passive 
failure events of the station components. In this analysis, it is assumed that only circuit 
breakers have active and passive failures modes.   
 
Step 2: Step 1 is repeated for all the station terminals. 
 
Step 3: The minimal cut sets derived for all the terminals in Figure 3.7 are shown in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Minimal cut sets for station terminals 
(A = active failure, P = passive failure) 
 
Terminal 1 Terminal 2 Terminal 3 Terminal 4 
CB1 (A)  CB3 (A)  CB3 (A)  CB1 (A)  
CB2 (A)  CB2 (A)  CB4 (A)  CB4 (A)  
BB1 + BB4  BB2 + BB3  BB1 + BB4  BB2 + BB3  
BB4 + CB1 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) BB2 + CB1 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) 
BB4 + CB4 (A) BB2 + CB4 (A) BB1 + CB3 (A) BB2 + CB4 (A) 
BB1 + CB3 (A) BB3 + CB1 (A) BB1 + CB2 (A) BB3 + CB1 (A) 
BB1 + CB2 (P) BB3 + CB2 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) BB3 + CB2 (P) 
BB2 BB4 BB3 BB1 
Minimal 
cut sets 
CB1 (P) + CB2 (P) CB2 (P) + CB3 (P) CB3 (P) + CB4 (P) CB1 (P) + CB4 (P) 
Figure 3.7:  Ring bus configuration 
Terminal 1 Terminal 4 
Terminal 3 Terminal 2 
CB 1 
CB 4 
CB 2 
CB 3 
BB 1 BB 2 
BB 3 BB 4 
Where, 
CB- Circuit breaker 
BB - Bus bar 
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Step 4: The minimal cut sets that result in the simultaneous outages of two or more 
terminals are extracted from Table 3.1 and are shown in Table 3.2. These minimal cut 
sets result in common terminal failures and are called common cut sets. The common 
terminal outage groups are marked with a similar subscript number.  
 
Step 5: The individual failure groups that result in the outage of a single terminal are 
used to modify the failure parameters of the corresponding station terminals. 
 
Table 3.2: Extracted minimal cut sets for station terminals 
(Subscripts indicate common failure group) 
 
Minimal cut 
sets type Terminal 1 Terminal 2 Terminal 3 Terminal 4 
CB1 (A) 1 CB3 (A) 3 CB3 (A) 3 CB1 (A) 1 
CB2 (A) 2 CB2 (A) 2 CB4 (A) 4 CB4 (A) 4 
Common 
terminal 
minimal cut 
sets BB1 + BB4 5 BB2 + BB3 6 BB1 + BB4 5 
BB2 + BB3 6 
 
BB4 + CB1 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) BB2 + CB1 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) 
BB4 + CB4 (A) BB2 + CB4 (A) BB1 + CB3 (A) BB2 + CB4 (A) 
BB1 + CB3 (A) BB3 + CB1 (A) BB1 + CB2 (A) BB3 + CB1 (A) 
BB1 + CB2 (P) BB3 + CB2 (P) BB2 + CB3 (P) BB3 + CB2 (P) 
BB2 BB4 BB3 BB1 
Independent 
minimal cut 
sets 
CB1 (P) + CB2 (P) CB2 (P) + CB3 (P) CB3 (P) + CB4 (P) CB1 (P) + CB4 (P) 
Group name of 
independent 
minimal cut 
sets 
T1 T2 T2 T3 
 
Step 6: If a transmission line has a station at each end, then the independent minimal cut 
sets derived from both stations are added in series with the line failure parameters.  
 
Step 7: The failure parameters of the common terminal minimal cut sets causing the 
outage of the same terminals are combined.  
 
The functional representation of the independent minimal cuts used to modify the failure 
parameters of the station terminals or the connections are shown in Figure 3.8. It should 
be noted that the common terminal failure group in Table 3.2 are not shown in detail in 
this representation. 
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Figure 3.8:  A functional representation for the ring bus configuration 
The equations necessary to modify the terminal parameters are shown in the following 
section. 
 
3.4 Equations for combining independent terminal failures  
The equations necessary for adding the transmission line failure parameters to the failure 
parameters of the independent minimal cut sets shown in Table 3.2 are given in 
Equations 3.6 to 3.8. 
λnew  =  λold + λset1 + λset2       (3.6) 
Unew  =  Uold + Uset1 + Uset2      (3.7) 
rnew    =  Unew                      (3.8) 
 
Where, 
λnew  - Modified failure rate of the transmission line after combining the independent cut 
sets 
λold  -  Failure rate of the transmission line  
λset1 – Total failure rate of the independent minimal cut sets on one end of the 
transmission line  
λset2 - Total failure rate of all the independent minimal cut sets on the other end of the 
transmission line 
Where,  
T1, T2, T3 and T4 represent the 
individual minimal cut sets for terminals 
Terminal 1,2,3 and 4 respectively in 
Table 3.2   
Terminal 4 
Terminal 3 Terminal 2 
  T2   T3 
  T1   T4 
Common 
failure cut sets 
Terminal 1 
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Unew - Modified unavailability of the transmission line after the inclusion of the 
independent cut sets 
Uold  - Unavailability of the transmission line  
Uset1 - Total unavailability of all the independent minimal cut sets on one end of line 
causing its failure 
Uset2 - Total unavailability of all the independent minimal cut sets on the other end of line 
causing its failure 
rnew – Modified outage time of the transmission line after combining the independent cut 
sets 
The independent cut set failure parameters are calculated as shown in Equations 3.9 to 
3.11 
λset1   = λcs1k                             (3.9)                                         
Uset1   = Ucs1k                            (3.10)                                                                                                     
rset1   = Uset1/
 
λset1                         (3.11)                                                                                                
Where, 
λcs1k- Failure rate of the kth independent minimal cut set on one end of the transmission 
line 
Ucs1k- Unavailability of the kth independent minimal cut set on one end of the 
transmission line 
rset1 -  Repair time of the independent minimal cut set on one end of the transmission line  
n - Total number of the independent minimal cut set on one of the ends of the 
transmission line 
The equations shown above are also used to include the failure parameters of the 
independent cut sets derived from the other end of the transmission line. 
 
3.5 Ring bus station application 
The new method described in Section 3.3 is applied to the ring bus example 
shown in Figure 3.7 using the equations presented in Section 3.4. The component failure 
data used are given in Table 3.3.  
(K=1 to n) 
(K=1 to n) 
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Table 3.3: Station component failure data (For the example) 
(F/yr) (F/yr) (F/yr) (Hr) (Hr)  
Active 
failure rate 
Passive 
failure rate 
Total failure 
rate 
Repair 
time 
Switching 
time 
Circuit breaker 0.0066 0.0005 0.0071 72 1 
Bus bar - - 0.022 10 - 
 
The failure rate, average repair times and unavailability for the independent minimal cut 
sets associated with Terminal 1 given in Table 3.2 are shown in Table 3.4. The equations 
for the second order minimal cut sets are given in Appendix F [38]. 
Table 3.4: Independent minimal cut sets for Terminal 1 
Event (T1) Failure rate (F/yr) Repair time (Hr) Unavailability 
BB4 + CB1 (P) 0.000001 8.78 0.000000 
BB4 + CB4 (A) 0.000002 0.91 0.000000 
BB1 + CB3 (A) 0.000002 0.91 0.000000 
BB1 + CB2 (P) 0.000001 8.78 0.000000 
BB2 0.022000 10.00 0.000025 
CB1 (P) + CB2 (P) 0.000000 36.00 0.000000 
Total 0.022006 10.00 0.000025 
 
It can be seen from Table 3.2 that all the station terminals have the same contribution 
due to station related failures and therefore the values for T1 in Table 3.4 are applicable 
to all the station terminals. The common outage values are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Common outage group corresponding to Terminal 1 
Event Failure rate (F/yr) Repair time (Hr) Unavailability 
CB1 (A) 0.006600 1 0.000001 
CB2 (A) 0.006600 1 0.000001 
BB1 + BB4 0.000111 5 0.000000 
 
It can be seen from Table 3.5, that circuit breaker active failures cause higher 
unavailability compared to the overlapping failure of two buses. The common terminal 
unavailability due to station component outages is directly dependent on their failure 
parameters. As in example, the unavailability due to bus bar failures will be higher if 
their failure parameters are very high compared to the active failure parameters of a 
circuit breaker. In the case of a ring bus scheme, all the terminals are equally affected by 
station related outages. This is not true, however for other station configurations in 
common use by utilities. The minimal cut sets shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 can be safely 
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ignored if their unavailability is less than six decimal places. The assessment of station 
failures is highly dependent on the component outage data and therefore the collection of 
station component outage data is an important task. This is discussed in the following 
section. 
 
3.6 Station component outage data 
The significant components in station reliability analysis are as follows [44] 
1. circuit breakers,  
2. main bus bars (commonly referred as the bus bars) and 
3. transformers. 
The station component failure data used in these analyses were obtained from a 
number of different sources. The circuit breaker failure data were obtained from the 
Canadian Electric Association Equipment Reliability Information System [42]. The bus 
bar failure data were taken from published research work [18-21].  Different utilities 
may have relatively higher bus bar failure rates than those assumed [43]. The 
transformer failure data were taken from [3].  
Active and passive failure rates of a circuit breaker  
Determining the active and passive failure rates of a circuit breaker is a difficult 
task because these data cannot usually be directly obtained from the component outage 
data provided by a utility. Some utilities however do collect circuit breaker data in a 
detailed manner, which can be used to derive the percentage ratio of active, and passive 
failures. The ratio of the active failures to the passive failure rates was derived from data 
shown in the CIGRE report (Working Group 06/ Study Committee 13: Reliability of HV 
circuit breaker) [41]. An approximate analysis of the data can be used to calculate the 
ratio of active and passive failure rates. The important definitions of the terms used in 
the CIGRE report are given in the following section together with some relevant data. 
CIGRE definitions and circuit breaker data  
Major Failure (of a circuit breaker):  Complete failure of a circuit breaker, which 
causes the lack of one or more of its fundamental functions [41]. 
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Note: A major failure will result in an immediate change in the system operating 
condition (e.g. the back up protective equipment being required to remove the fault) or 
will result in mandatory removal from service for non scheduled maintenance. A major 
failure is also termed as the forced outage of a circuit breaker [41].  
Minor Failure (of a circuit breaker):  Failure of a circuit breaker other than a major 
failure [41]. 
The CIGRE data indicates that the bulk of the failures associated with circuit breakers 
can be designated as active failures. The component data [3,18-21,42] used for station 
analysis in the research work presented in this thesis is shown in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Station component data  
Component λa (Failures/yr) 
λp 
(Failures/yr) 
λT 
(Failures/yr) 
s 
(Hours) 
r 
(Hours) 
Circuit breaker [42] 0.00963 0.00107 0.0107 1.00 93.62 
Main Bus bar [18] - - 0.025 - 10.00 
Reliability analyses of the composite test systems are presented in the following section. 
3.7 Analysis of composite test systems with stations 
The method described in Section 3.3 is used in this section to include station 
related outages in composite system reliability evaluation. The composite test systems, 
RBTS and IEEE-RTS shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 respectively are used for analysis. 
The station schemes listed below are included in the RBTS reliability studies [22].  
1. ring bus,  
2. double bus double breaker,  
3. one and one half and 
4. one and one third breaker  
The single diagram of the RBTS becomes complicated when the load buses are replaced 
by stations. The single line diagrams of the RBTS with different station configurations 
are shown in Figures 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12. The load point transformers shown in 
these diagrams are not used for the initial analyses shown in this section. 
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Figure 3.9: Single-line diagram of the RBTS with ring bus configurations 
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 Figure 3.10: Single line diagram of the RBTS with double bus double breaker 
                     configurations  
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Figure 3.11: Single line diagram of the RBTS with one and one half breaker 
                      configurations   
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Figure 3.12: Single line diagram of the RBTS with one and one third circuit breaker 
                      configurations  
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RBTS reliability evaluation with station related outages 
During the planning of a composite system it is necessary to select an appropriate 
station configuration. It is a difficult task to include and compare the performance of 
different station configurations in a large composite system. The RBTS shown in Figure 
3.13 is a small composite system and can be relatively easily used to compare the system 
performance with different station configurations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Extended single line diagram of the RBTS for including station related   
                      outages   
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The method in Section 3.3 is used for incorporating station related outages in 
composite system reliability evaluation and the single line diagrams shown in Figures 
3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 are reduced to that shown in Figure 3.13. The reliability results 
for the RBTS with different station configurations are given in the following sections. 
 
RBTS with ring bus schemes 
This section presents the reliability indices for the RBTS with ring bus station 
configurations. The load bus and the system indices for the system shown in Figure 3.13 
are given in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. These indices can be compared with those shown in 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6. It can be seen that the load point and system indices show a 
significant increase due to the incorporation of station related outages. 
Table 3.7: Load bus indices (RBTS with ring bus schemes) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00003 0.02521 0.323 0.00032 2.80 Bus 16 
17 0.00022 0.13616 2.748 0.00362 31.73 Bus 17 
18 0.00003 0.03243 0.811 0.00081 7.10 Bus 18 
19 0.00004 0.03825 0.478 0.00046 3.99 Bus 19 
20 0.00136 1.36287 17.301 0.01727 151.27  Bus 20 
 
Table 3.8: System indices (RBTS with ring bus schemes) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.58347 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.22 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 14.60 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.00167 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.02247 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 196.88 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 870.20 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.11709 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 1.06421 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
13.68 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00012 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 63.85 
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RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes  
The detailed single line diagram for the RBTS with double bus double breaker 
station configurations is shown in Figure 3.10. This representation is reduced to that 
shown in Figure 3.13. The load bus and system indices are shown in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 
and these indices again show an increase compared to the base case indices given in 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6. This increase is however is less than that for the RBTS with ring bus 
configurations. 
Table 3.9: Load bus indices (RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes) 
 
No. 
Bus PLC 
ENLC 
(1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00000 0.00000 0.000 0.00000 0.000 Bus 16 
17 0.00019 0.10787 1.238 0.00212 18.582 Bus 17 
18 0.00000 0.00104 0.007 0.00000 0.031 Bus 18 
19 0.00000 0.00564 0.061 0.00003 0.289 Bus 19 
20 0.00121 1.23026 15.614 0.01536 134.744  Bus 20 
 
Table 3.10: System indices (RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.3332 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.20 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 12.26 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.0014 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.01752 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 153.64 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 678.28                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.09146 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.82949 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
12.69 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00009 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 49.83 
 
 
RBTS with one and one half breaker schemes 
This section presents the reliability indices for the RBTS with one and one half 
circuit breaker configurations. The load bus and system indices are shown in Tables 3.11 
and 3.12. The system and load bus indices are slightly higher than those obtained for the 
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RBTS with double bus double breaker stations. The ENLC values at the load buses are 
less than that of the RBTS with double bus double breaker configurations. 
 
Table 3.11: Load bus indices (RBTS with one and one half breaker schemes) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00000 0.00892 0.114 0.00001 0.112 Bus 16 
17 0.00019 0.11189 1.474 0.00215 18.818 Bus 17 
18 0.00000 0.00103 0.007 0.00000 0.031 Bus 18 
19 0.00000 0.01439 0.173 0.00005 0.401 Bus 19 
20 0.00122 1.22000 15.484 0.01547 135.508 Bus 20 
 
Table 3.12: System indices (RBTS with one and one half breaker schemes) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.34471 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.19 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 12.35 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.00141 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.01768 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 154.87 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 684.53                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.09326 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.83714 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
12.82964 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00010 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 50.23 
 
 
RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes 
The load bus and system indices are shown in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 for the RBTS 
with one and one half breaker configurations. The indices are again slightly higher than 
those for the base case indices. The system indices for the four different station 
configurations are compared in the next section.  
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Table 3.13: Load bus indices (RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.000 Bus 16 
17 0.00020 0.12092 1.960 0.00220 19.30 Bus 17 
18 0.00000 0.00994 0.235 0.00003 0.031 Bus 18 
19 0.00000 0.00557 0.060 0.00003 0.289 Bus 19 
20 0.00121 1.21902 15.47 0.01533 134.74  Bus 20 
 
 
Table 3.14: System indices (RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 1.34393 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.12 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 12.26 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.0014 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.01760 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 154.18 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 681.44                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.09581 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.83336 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
13.19 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00010 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 50.00 
 
 
Comparison of the system reliability indices for the RBTS            
The comparison is based on the percentage increase in a system index over that 
obtained in the base case shown in Table 2.6. Figure 3.14 presents a comparison of the 
increase in the system indices associated with the four station configurations considered. 
It can be seen that the RBTS with ring bus configuration has the highest percentage 
increase compared to the RBTS with other station configurations. 
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Figure 3.14: Relative impact on the system reliability indices for the RBTS due  
                     to station configurations  
 
The comparisons shown in Figure 3.14 are based on the parameters shown in 
Table 3.6. Variation in the indices with changes in station component failure parameters 
are illustrated in Chapter 4. The most significant increase in the system indices is 
associated with the ring bus configuration. This is the least expensive configuration in 
terms of capital cost. The double bus double breaker configuration results in the lowest 
system ENLC and EENS and is the most expensive configuration. 
 
IEEE-RTS with station related outages 
The application of the proposed method for incorporating station configuration in 
composite system reliability analysis is further illustrated using the IEEE-RTS. The 
IEEE-RTS has 24 buses that require station models. The single line diagram of the 
IEEE-RTS becomes very complicated with the direct inclusion of stations. This can be 
seen from Figure 3.15. This complicated system is difficult to analyze directly. The 
method presented in Section 3.3 can be used to reduce the IEEE-RTS to the form shown 
in Figure 3.16.  
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Figure 3.15: Single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS with stations 
 
 60 
 
Figure 3.16: Extended single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS including station related  
                      outages  
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Load bus and system indices for the IEEE-RTS with stations: 
The load bus and the system indices for the IEEE-RTS with stations are shown in 
Tables 3.15 and 3.16. There is an increase in the indices compared to the base case 
indices presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 due to the contributions made by station related 
outages. 
Table 3.15: Load bus indices (IEEE-RTS with stations) 
No. 
Bus PLC 
ENLC 
(1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
29 0.00000 0.00000 0.000 0.00000 0.000 Bus29 
34 0.00000 0.00131 0.047 0.00004 0.344 Bus34 
35 0.00003 0.03811 4.387 0.00345 30.257 Bus35 
36 0.00002 0.02301 1.089 0.00076 6.634 Bus36 
37 0.00003 0.03651 1.658 0.00118 10.344 Bus37 
38 0.00003 0.03854 3.352 0.00244 21.337 Bus38 
39 0.00004 0.05081 4.029 0.00304 26.635 Bus39 
43 0.00002 0.03210 3.502 0.00241 21.083 Bus43 
44 0.00114 0.95978 61.301 0.07183 629.191 Bus44 
45 0.00005 0.06753 8.078 0.00599 52.438 Bus45 
49 0.00003 0.04036 6.842 0.00475 41.576 Bus49 
50 0.00024 0.24968 19.310 0.01689 147.993 Bus50 
51 0.00066 0.55107 47.537 0.05503 482.069 Bus51 
59 0.00011 0.11368 5.092 0.00484 42.433 Bus59 
61 0.00005 0.06400 9.513 0.00741 64.933 Bus61 
62 0.00201 1.64274 105.593 0.12936 1133.161 Bus62 
63 0.00008 0.08895 5.211 0.00449 39.317 Bus63 
 
Table 3.16: System indices (IEEE-RTS with stations) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.16527 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 9.64 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 20.87 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.00238 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.31390 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 2749.74 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 11603.90 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.10054 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.96482 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
132.34 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00011 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 57.89 
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3.8 Effect of including load point transformers 
As discussed in Section 2.7, the presence of load point transformers in a composite 
system analysis can significantly impact the predicted system performance. The load 
point transformer failure data are given in Appendix B (Table B-7). The effects of 
including load point transformers are illustrated in the following section 
 
RBTS with load point transformers and stations 
  A comparison of the reliability indices for the RBTS with different station 
configurations (Figures 3.9 to 3.12) and with load point transformers is shown in Figure 
3.17. The RBTS configurations shown in Figure 3.9 to 3.12 are reduced to the 
representation shown in Figure 2.9 for composite system analysis. The reliability indices 
for the RBTS with load point transformers and stations are shown in Appendix C. 
 
It can be seen from the Figure 3.17 that the RBTS with ring bus configurations 
has the maximum percentage increase compared to the base case indices presented in 
Tables 2.11 and 2.12. The percentage increase is less than that in the case of the RBTS 
Figure 3.17: Relative impact on the system reliability indices for the RBTS due 
                      to station configurations and load point transformers  
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without load point transformers. The specific impact can be seen from the numerical 
values in Appendix C. The RBTS analysis with one and one half breaker configurations 
and one and one third breaker configurations show a very similar performance when the 
EENS values are compared. The ENLC indices for the RBTS with the double bus 
double breaker configuration are relatively high in this case.  
 
 
IEEE-RTS with load point transformers and stations 
The complicated single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS with stations and load point 
transformers is reduced to the system shown in Figure 2.10. The load bus and system 
indices for the IEEE-RTS in this case are shown in Tables 3.17 and 3.18.  
 
Table 3.17: Load bus indices  
(IEEE-RTS with load point transformers and stations) 
 
No. 
Bus PLC 
ENLC 
(1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
29 0.00171 0.91241 63.030 0.117850 1032.378 Bus29 
34 0.00168 0.92467 57.099 0.10414 912.283 Bus34 
35 0.00175 0.98221 113.086 0.20149 1765.009 Bus35 
36 0.00184 1.00243 47.448 0.08690 761.273 Bus36 
37 0.00173 0.95989 43.593 0.07838 686.650 Bus37 
38 0.00177 0.97482 84.800 0.15397 1348.802 Bus38 
39 0.00180 1.00140 80.034 0.14360 1257.939 Bus39 
43 0.00188 1.04214 113.978 0.20541 1799.405 Bus43 
44 0.00463 3.21676 243.980 0.36812 3224.769 Bus44 
45 0.00182 1.00164 123.215 0.22567 1976.858 Bus45 
49 0.00183 1.01088 171.348 0.30985 2714.302 Bus49 
50 0.00241 1.52448 158.224 0.26085 2285.040 Bus50 
51 0.00343 2.29298 313.426 0.50447 4419.165 Bus51 
59 0.00205 1.24607 73.372 0.12369 1083.537 Bus59 
61 0.00187 1.07664 215.856 0.38462 3369.308 Bus61 
62 0.00658 4.64346 353.556 0.52131 4566.651 Bus62 
63 0.00202 1.16116 88.431 0.15791 1383.302 Bus63 
 
The results shown in these tables can be compared with the values given in Tables 3.15 
and 3.16. The inclusion of the load point transformers has a significant impact on the 
predicted indices. The impact will be reduced considerably if redundant transformer 
capacity is provided. 
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Table 3.18: System indices  
(IEEE-RTS with load point transformers and stations) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 19.85 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 15.16 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 301.034 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.0344 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 3.9482 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 34586.51 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 145955.071 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.82263 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 12.13562 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 118.0894 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00139 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 728.137 
 A comparison of the system reliability indices for the IEEE-RTS with and without load 
point transformers is shown in Figure 3.18.  
Figure 3.18: Relative impact on the system reliability indices of the IEEE-RTS with       
                     stations, with and without load point transformers 
 
Figure 3.18 shows that the impact on the system indices of including station 
related outages is much less than that associated with including single load point 
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transformers in the analysis. The numerical values used to create Figure 3.18 are given 
in Tables 3.16, 3.18, 2.6 and 2.10. 
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter describes a method for including station related outages in 
composite system evaluation. This chapter also illustrates the basic state space models 
used for the various station components.  
 The method is presented using a ring bus configuration example. The necessary 
equations required to include station related outages in an HL-II reliability evaluation 
are also given.  
Detailed RBTS reliability analyses are presented using different station 
configurations. The resulting load point and system indices are compared. The relative 
impact of the different station configurations on the system reliability indices can clearly 
be seen from the analyses. The effects of including stations in a composite system 
analysis are further illustrated in this chapter using the IEEE-RTS. The results show that 
station related outages are important factors in the system assessment and significantly 
affect the predicted indices. 
Analyses were conducted on both the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS to examine the 
impact on the predicted system and load point indices of including load point 
transformers in the analysis. The use of single load point transformers results in a 
substantial increase in the predicted indices. These effects will be diminished if 
redundant transformer capacity is included in the evaluation. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Sensitivity Studies on Composite Test Systems with Stations 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Assessing the effects of component failures on the system performance is an 
important composite system planning activity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the station 
components present in a composite system play a significant role in system performance. 
The new method described in Chapter 3, is used in this chapter to determine the effects 
of variations in selected station components failure rates on the composite system 
performance. The composite test systems and the station configurations analyzed in 
Chapter 3 are used in a series of sensitivity studies. Some of the station configurations 
have been modified in order to improve the composite system reliability. The analysis 
described in this chapter is done using the station component failure parameters shown 
in Chapter 3, as the base values. The failure parameters of the circuit breakers and bus 
bars are varied in order to observe this effect on the composite system reliability. The 
composite system sensitivity analyses conducted are described in the following sections. 
Load point transformers are not included in these studies. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis on the RBTS with stations 
The RBTS is a small test system and is used extensively in this chapter for 
sensitivity analysis. The different station configurations presented in Chapter 3 are used 
in the sensitivity studies. The EENS index is an important indicator of system 
performance and is used for assessing the RBTS performance. Other indices could also 
be used if desired. The sensitivity studies done on the RBTS with ring bus schemes are 
as follows. 
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RBTS with ring bus schemes 
The single line diagram of the RBTS with ring bus schemes is shown in Figure 
3.9. The effect on the RBTS performance of varying the bus bar failure rate can be seen 
in Figure 4.1. The load bus and system indices increase with an increase in the bus bar 
failure rates. The effect is quite significant at all the buses and for the system, as the bus 
bars are important components in a ring bus configuration. 
 
 
Other system and load bus indices show similar behavior with increase in the bus 
bar failure rate. The effect on the system performance of increasing the repair time of a 
bus bar is similar to the effect due to increasing the bus bar failure rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bus bar failure rate multiplier 
Figure 4.1: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the RBTS with ring bus  
                    schemes                                                                                                                         
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The effect on the EENS index of varying the circuit breaker failure rates can be observed 
from Figure 4.2. It can be seen that the system EENS of the RBTS with ring bus 
schemes is relatively less sensitive to increases in the circuit breaker failure rate as 
compared to that of varying the bus bar failure rate. 
Figure 4.2: Effect of varying the circuit breaker failure rates in the RBTS with  
                        ring bus schemes 
 
 
RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes 
The single line diagram of the RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes is 
shown in Figure 3.10. The effect of varying the failure rates of the double bus double 
breaker station components can be observed from Figures 4.3 and 4.4. There is no 
significant increase in the EENS values at the load buses and for the system, when the 
bus bar failure rates are varied.  
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Figure 4.3: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the RBTS with  
                    double bus double breaker schemes 
 
Figure 4.4: Effect of varying the circuit breaker failure rates in the RBTS with  
                    double bus double breaker schemes 
 
 
The variation in the EENS with circuit breaker failure rate is very similar to that shown 
in Figure 4.2 for the RBTS with ring bus schemes. 
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RBTS with one and one half circuit breaker schemes 
This station configuration is widely used in composite power systems [22]. The 
RBTS diagram for this case is shown in Figure 3.11. Figure 4.5 shows the response of 
the RBTS with one and one half breaker configurations to variations in the bus bar 
failure rates. 
Figure 4.5: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the RBTS with  
                    one and one half breaker schemes  
 
It can be seen from Figure 4.5 that the RBTS with one and one half circuit 
breaker schemes is not very sensitive to variations in the bus bar failure rate.  
Figure 4.6 shows the effect of varying the circuit breaker failure rates on the 
EENS index. It can be observed that the system EENS of the RBTS with one and one 
half breaker schemes is similar to that shown in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.6: Effect of varying the circuit breaker failure rates in the RBTS with  
                            one and one half breaker schemes 
 
 
 
RBTS with one and one third circuit breaker schemes 
This configuration has fewer breakers per terminal compared to the one and one 
half breaker configuration and is shown in Figure 3.12.  The effect on the performance 
of the RBTS with one and one third breaker configurations of varying the bus bar failure 
rate can be observed from Figure 4.7. It can be seen that the load bus and system EENS 
indices are relatively insensitive to variations in the bus bar failure rates.  
The effect on the performance of the RBTS of varying the circuit breaker failure 
rates can be observed from Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.7: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the RBTS with  
                    one and one third breaker schemes 
Figure 4.8: Effect of varying the circuit breaker failure rates in the RBTS with  
                    one and one third breaker schemes 
 
The system EENS values are sensitive to variations in the circuit breaker failure 
rates and are similar to those shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.6. Load bus 17 is more 
sensitive to variations in the circuit breaker failure rates compared to the other load 
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buses. The studies done on the RBTS with one and one third circuit breaker 
configurations shows that this configuration is more reliable than the ring bus scheme. 
The performance of the RBTS with one and one third stations is similar to that of the 
RBTS with one and one half circuit breaker stations and the RBTS with double bus 
double breaker configurations. It should be noted, however that the behavior of the 
RBTS with different station configurations could change with different station 
components failure parameters. 
 
Comparison of variations in the circuit breaker failure rate  
 Figure 4.9 shows a comparison of the RBTS performance with different station 
configurations as a function of the circuit breaker failure rates. The variations in the 
system EENS index for all the configurations are very similar.  
 
Figure 4.9: Station comparison of the impact of variations in the circuit breaker failure  
                    rates on the EENS index. (Note: DBDB- Double bus double breaker) 
 
The RBTS with double bus double breaker configurations is slightly more sensitive to 
variations in the circuit breaker failure rates as compared to the RBTS with one and one 
half breaker configurations and one and one third breaker configurations. 
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis of the IEEE-RTS with stations 
This section deals with sensitivity analysis of the IEEE-RTS with station related outages.  
It can be seen from the analysis in Chapter 3 that the IEEE-RTS reliability is highly 
influenced by generation outages and therefore station outages will not create a large 
increase in the system reliability indices. In order to examine the effect of station 
outages, the system was analyzed under the assumption that the generation facilities are 
completely reliable. The analysis in this case is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Station related outage contributions to the IEEE-RTS transmission outages. 
System Indices/Units IEEE-RTS without 
stations  
IEEE-RTS with 
stations 
Expected number of load curtailments  
(1/ year) ENLC 0.00038 0.38010 
Average duration of load curtailment 
(hrs/disturbance) ADLC 10.2406 8.95 
Expected duration of load curtailment  
(Hrs / year) EDLC 0.00384 3.40029 
Probability of load curtailments 
PLC 0.00 0.00039 
Expected demand not supplied  
(MW) EDNS 0.00002 0.04128 
Expected energy not supplied  
(MWhr / year) EENS 0.18975 369.54 
Expected Damage Cost  
(K$/ year) EDC 0.80076 1559.45 
Bulk Power-interruption Index  
(MW/MW- year) BPII 0.00001 0.01453 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index  
(MWhr /MW- year) BECI 0.00007 0.12966 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment 
Index (MW/disturbance) BPACI 39.24 108.92 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index 
(MW/MW) MBECI 0.00 0.00001 
Severity Index (System minutes/ year) SI 0.004 7.77973 
 
It can be observed from Table 4.1 that the EENS increases from 0.18975 
MWhr/yr to 324.76 MWhr/yr with the inclusion of station outages. The load bus indices 
also show a comparable increase. This clearly illustrates that station outages can make a 
significant contribution to total transmission outages in the IEEE-RTS. The sensitivity 
analysis conducted on the IEEE-RTS with stations is described in the following sections. 
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Effect of circuit breaker failure rates on the IEEE-RTS performance 
 The failure rates of the circuit breakers in the IEEE-RTS were modified to 
examine the effect on the system reliability. The circuit breaker failure rates on the 
138kV side of the system were modified first, followed by the circuit breaker failure 
rates on the 230kV side of the system.  
 
138kV Circuit breaker failure rate variation: 
The effect on the load bus indices of varying the 138kV circuit breaker failure rates can 
be seen in Figures 4.10 to 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.10: Effect of varying the138kV circuit breaker failure rates in  
                        the IEEE-RTS with stations (buses 29 to 37) 
 
Figure 4.10 shows that the load bus indices on the 138kV side are sensitive to increases 
in the circuit breaker failure rates on the 138kV side of the system. The effect of these 
variations in the failure rate also depends on the station configuration (Appendix D) used 
at each load bus. Load buses 29 and 34 show a very small increase because they are 
connected to stations at buses 1 and 2 with one and one third breaker configurations. 
(Refer to Figures D-1 &D- 2 in Appendix D for bus 1 and 2, which supply load to buses 
29 and 34 respectively). Figure 4.11 and 4.12 show the increase in the EENS at other 
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load buses. Buses 35 and 36 are ring configurations and hence they show a higher 
increase with variations in the circuit breaker failure rate. The increase in this case is not 
linear and can be observed from Figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.11: Effect of varying the 138kV circuit breaker failure rates in  
                        the IEEE-RTS with stations (buses 38 to 49)    
 
The load point indices at buses 38, 39 and 43 (Figure 4.11) show an increase 
with increase in the 138kV circuit breaker failure rates. These buses have ring 
configurations, which are comparatively less reliable than the one and one third breaker 
configurations, or the one and one half breaker configurations. Figure 4.12 shows that 
the 230kV side of the IEEE-RTS is relatively insensitive to increases in the failure rates 
of the 138kV circuit breakers. 
 
230kV Circuit breaker failure rate variation: 
The effect of increasing the failure rates of the 230kV circuit breakers can be 
seen from Figure 4.13. It can be observed from this figure that the load bus indices on 
the 230kV side are sensitive to these increases in the circuit breaker failure rate. The 
actual increase in the EENS at the load buses depends on the station configuration used. 
Load buses 29, 34 to 39 and 43 to 45 are relatively less sensitive to variations in the 
230kV circuit breaker failure rates. 
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Figure 4.12: Effect of varying the138kV circuit breaker failure rates in  
                        the IEEE-RTS with stations (buses 44 to 63) 
 
Figure 4.13: Effect of varying the 230kV circuit breaker failure rates in     
                                  the IEEE-RTS with stations (buses 44 to 63) 
 
Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates on the IEEE-RTS 
performance 
The bus bar failure rate is assumed to be same for all the buses irrespective of the 
voltage level of the system and therefore changing the bus bar failure rate affects the 
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performance of the load bus indices on both the 138kV and 230kV sides of the IEEE-
RTS. Figure 4.14 shows that the increase in selected load bus indices is linear with 
respect to change in the bus bar failure rate. 
 
Figure 4.14: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the IEEE-RTS with                                                      
                       stations (buses 29 to 38) 
 
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the effects of bus bar failures on the load bus indices 
at other load buses in the system. The actual increase depends on the station 
configuration at a bus and on the adjacent station configurations. In the case of load bus 
29 there is a small increase in the indices because the station has a one and one third 
breaker configuration. This is also the case for bus 34. Load bus 35 is a ring type station 
configuration and therefore this bus shows a significant increase. 
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Figure 4.15: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the IEEE-RTS  
          with stations (buses 39 to 50) 
 
Figure 4.16: Effect of varying the bus bar failure rates in the IEEE-RTS  
                       with stations (buses 51 to 63) 
 
The sensitivity analysis conducted on the IEEE-RTS supports the conclusions 
drawn from the RBTS analysis regarding the reliability effects of the different station 
configurations. The same conclusions can be applied to larger composite systems with 
the same component failure parameters. The studies described in this section have been 
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used to modify the IEEE-RTS to improve the system performance. The station 
modifications used in the IEEE-RTS are described in the following section. 
 
4.4 IEEE-RTS reliability improvements 
The results in Section 4.3 clearly indicate the locations in the IEEE-RTS where 
reliability improvements can be made by changing the station configurations. The 
reliability improvements due to station modifications at selected buses are illustrated in 
the following sections. 
 
Station modification at bus 19 (load bus 62):  
This load bus has the highest EENS and therefore it is a candidate for 
modification. The increase in the EENS due to the inclusion of station outages is not 
particularly high when compared to the increase in the indices at other load buses. Bus 
19 has a meshed ring configuration as seen from Figure D-19 (Appendix D). This 
configuration is influenced to a great extent by both bus bar failures and circuit breaker 
failures. This configuration was replaced with the one and one half breaker configuration 
shown in Figure E-1 (Appendix E). Table 4.2 shows that the EENS and PLC values at 
the connected load bus 62, after modifying the station at a bus 19 has decreased. The 
modified values of the EENS and PLC are similar to those of bus 19 without stations. In 
this case the indices at other associated load buses will also change slightly due to 
modification of load bus 19. 
Table 4.2: Effects of station modification at bus 19 
Bus 19 
(Load bus 62) 
EENS (MWhr/yr) PLC 
Without stations 1114.4 0.00199 
Ring bus configuration 1133.2 0.00201 
One and half breaker 
configuration 1114.9 0.00199 
 
Station modification at bus 3 (load bus 35):  
This load bus has the highest increase in reliability indices of all the load buses 
when stations are included in the analysis. The station configuration at bus 3 is a pure 
ring configuration with four terminals and is shown in Figure D-3 (Appendices D). This 
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station was changed to the one and one half breaker configuration shown in Figure E-2 
(Appendix E). It can be observed from Table 4.3 that using a one and half breaker 
configuration at bus 3 results in a considerable reduction in the EENS at load bus 35 
 
Table 4.3: Effect of station modification at bus 3 
Bus 3 
(Load bus 35) EENS (MWhr/yr) PLC 
Without stations 0.0 0.0 
Ring configuration 30.3 0.00003 
One and half breaker 
configuration 0.001 0.0 
 
Figure 4.17 shows a comparison of the increase in the system indices due to the station 
modifications at buses 3 and 19. 
Figure 4.17: Effect of stations modification on reliability indices of the IEEE-RTS 
 
Figure 4.17 shows that the modifications made at these two buses significantly improve 
the overall system reliability. Similar changes could be made at other stations to achieve 
higher levels of load point and system reliability. The resulting benefits should be 
compared with the cost associated with the modifications. 
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4.5 Summary 
The new method presented in Chapter 3 for the inclusion of station related 
outages in HL-II evaluation was used to perform selective sensitivity studies on the 
RBTS and the IEEE- RTS. The EENS index is used to illustrate the system performance. 
The four different station configurations shown in Chapter 3 are used in the sensitivity 
studies presented in this chapter.  
The RBTS with ring bus configurations is more sensitive to variations in the 
station component failure parameters than the RBTS with other station configurations. 
The RBTS with double bus double breaker configurations is relatively insensitive to 
variations in the bus bar failure rates.  
In the case of the IEEE-RTS it was observed that the contributions due to station 
related outages to the system transmission outage events are significant. Selected 
stations in the IEEE-RTS were modified using more reliable configurations, in order to 
improve the system reliability. The load bus indices at the adjacent stations are slightly 
affected due to the modification of a station in the IEEE-RTS. 
The sensitivity analysis conducted on the RBTS supports the conclusions drawn 
from the IEEE-RTS analysis regarding the reliability effects of different station 
configurations. The RBTS with ring bus configurations has the lowest reliability of the 
four configuration studied. It also uses the least number of circuit breakers and has the 
lowest capital cost. The RBTS with double bus double breaker configurations, one and 
one half breaker configurations and one and one third breaker configurations show a 
similar behavior due to variations in the circuit breaker failure rates. The RBTS with one 
and one half breaker configurations has a slightly higher reliability than the RBTS with 
one and one third breaker configurations and a slightly higher cost. The conclusions 
drawn from the sensitivity analysis presented in this chapter can be applied to larger 
composite systems with the same set of component failure parameters. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
 
The basic objective of the research described in this thesis, is to develop a 
method that can be used to include station related outages in composite system reliability 
analysis. The objective is described in detail in Chapter 1. Consideration of station 
related outages in composite system reliability analysis is a complex task and has 
received considerable attention from power system researchers in the past. The effects of 
station related outages can propagate to other parts of a system and cause severe 
damages. Stations are nodal points in a power system that control and monitor the flow 
of electric current and therefore failures in stations can significantly affect the load point 
supply.  
Composite system reliability can be evaluated using both analytical methods and 
Monte Carlo simulation. A Monte Carlo simulation is a fluctuating convergence process 
that generates a series of experiments to assess power system reliability. This approach 
was used for composite system analysis in this research. A brief description of Monte 
Carlo simulation is given in Chapter 2, where different types of Monte Carlo methods 
are described. State sampling, which is a non-sequential method, is combined with 
enumeration techniques in the MECORE software used in this research. A brief review 
of the MECORE software is given in Chapter 2, in order to provide an appreciation of its 
structure and capabilities. The MECORE software is used to calculate a variety of 
reliability indices at the load point and system levels.  
The RBTS and IEEE-RTS composite test systems used in this research are 
described in Chapter 2. The RBTS is a relatively small test system and was used for 
detailed study of the new method presented in this thesis for incorporating stations in 
composite system analysis. The IEEE-RTS is relatively larger test system and was used 
for some limited studies. The basic single diagrams of the composite test systems were 
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extended to included station related outages in the reliability analysis. It was observed 
from the studies conducted that the RBTS requires more simulation samples for 
convergence than the IEEE-RTS.  
The reliability analyses of the RBTS and the IEEE-RTS were done using the 
economic priority order for load curtailment. Predetermined IEAR values were used in 
the load curtailment philosophy for both test systems. The base case reliability indices 
for the two test systems are given in Chapter 2., The reliability indices at the load points 
and at the system level increase significantly when load point transformers are included 
in the analysis. The provision of standby or redundant transformers at a load point 
minimizes the effect of load point transformers. Chapter 2 describes the necessary 
concepts required to understand the new method used to include station related outages.  
Stations are complex networks and their consideration in composite system 
analysis requires considerable effort. State space diagrams were used in order to 
understand the outage process and incorporate the effects of station component failures. 
Station components such as circuit breakers, bus bars and transformers are modeled 
using Markov processes.  Common terminal failures due to station related outages 
causing failures of two or more station terminals are described in Chapter 3.  
The published research indicates the difficulties and improvements required to 
represent station outages in HL-II reliability studies. A new method is presented in 
Chapter 3 to include the effects of common terminal outages caused by station 
component failures. This method is simple and easy to implement and considers station 
related outages in a straightforward manner. The minimal cut set approach is used to 
numerically incorporate station related outages [38]. This method is illustrated using a 
ring bus scheme example and the derived equations are given in Chapter 3. The 
equations required for incorporating station related outages in HL-II reliability studies 
are relatively simple.  
A major problem in incorporating station related outages in composite system 
analyses is the availability of suitable station component data. These difficulties are 
discussed in Section 3.6. It was difficult to obtain suitable data on active and passive 
failures of circuit breakers from the CIGRE and CEA databases and some assumptions 
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had to be made. Bus bar and transformer failure data were taken from published 
literature [18, 21].  
The single line diagrams for the two test systems including station configurations 
are shown in Chapter 3. The reliability analysis conducted on the RBTS shows that the 
use of ring bus configurations results in significantly higher reliability indices than that 
found for the other station configurations. These analyses assume that the bus bar failure 
rates are the same for different station configurations. This may not be the case for all 
utilities. The IEEE-RTS has a strong transmission system and a weak generation system 
and therefore the major contributions to the load point and system indices are from the 
generation facilities.  
When load point transformers are included with station related outages in a 
composite system reliability evaluation, the percentage increase due to station related 
outages is relatively less than that in a composite system without load point transformers 
and with stations. The presence of single load point transformers at all the load points 
dominates the station failure effects.  
Selected sensitivities studies conducted on the composite test systems are 
presented in Chapter 4. It can be observed from these studies that the effect of variations 
in the station component failure rates is not the same for the RBTS with different station 
configurations. The reliability indices of the RBTS with ring bus schemes are sensitive 
to variations in the bus bar failure rates, and are relatively less sensitive to increases in 
the circuit breaker failure rates. The EENS index for the RBTS with double bus double 
breaker configurations, one and one half breaker configurations and one and one third 
breaker configurations are insensitive to variations in bus bar failure rates. The 
sensitivity studies presented in Chapter 4 are useful in power system planning.  
The station related outages contribute in a significant way to the system related 
transmission outages of the IEEE-RTS. Variable failure rates for the 138kV and the 
230kV circuit breakers were considered in the IEEE-RTS analysis. These changes in one 
side of the system affect that side only, with relatively slight effects in the other side.  It 
was assumed that the bus bar failure rates for all the stations in the IEEE-RTS are the 
same. The load point indices of stations with ring bus configurations are sensitive to 
variations in the bus bar failure rates.  
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Selected station configurations were modified in order to improve the IEEE-RTS 
performance. As described in Chapter 4, the station modifications at the selected buses 
significantly improve the system performance. Slight changes are observed in the load 
point indices of the adjacent stations due to these modifications. The IEEE-RTS 
transmission system is relatively reliable and therefore an outage in a station does not 
affect the delivery point indices at the adjacent stations in a significant manner.  
The new method presented in Chapter 3, has been successfully used for 
incorporating station related outages in composite system analysis. The research work 
presented in this thesis shows that importance should be given to the inclusion of station 
related outages in composite system studies. The incorporation of station related outages 
in the composite analysis is highly dependent on the availability of accurate component 
failure data. The conclusions drawn from the analysis presented in this thesis can be 
applied to larger composite systems. It is expected that the techniques and the concepts 
presented in this thesis should be useful to electric utility planners and decision makers. 
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Table A-2: Load bus data for the   
                    RBTS 
 
Bus no. Priority Code 
Load 
(p.u) 
2 1009 0.20 
3 1005 0.85 
4 1008 0.40 
5 1007 0.20 
6 1006 0.20 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Basic data for the RBTS  
 
The data used for reliability analysis of the RBTS are given in Tables A-1, A-2 and A-3. 
 
Table A-1: Generation data for the RBTS 
 
Bus 
No. 
Capacity 
(p.u) 
 
Forced 
Outage Rate 
MTTR 
(Hrs) 
7 0.40 0.02825 41.38 
8 0.40 0.02825 41.38 
9 0.10 0.01825 40.17 
10 0.20 0.02325 40.17 
11 0.05 0.00825 36.50 
12 0.05 0.00825 36.50 
13 0.40 0.01825 53.65 
14 0.20 0.01325 48.77 
14 0.20 0.01325 48.77 
15 0.20 0.01325 48.77 
15 0.20 0.01325 48.77 
 
Table A-3: Transmission line or transformer data for the RBTS 
 
No. ID From To Capacity (p.u) 
1/Reactance 
(p.u) FOR 
MTTR 
(Hrs) 
1 L1 Bus 1 Bus 3 0.85000 5.55556 0.00171 10.0 
1 L2 Bus 1 Bus 3 0.85000 5.55556 0.00171 10.0 
2 L3 Bus 2 Bus 4 0.71000 1.66667 0.00571 10.0 
2 L4 Bus 2 Bus 4 0.71000 1.66667 0.00571 10.0 
3 L5 Bus 1 Bus 2 0.71000 2.08883 0.00457 10.0 
4 L6 Bus 3 Bus 4 0.71000 8.33333 0.00114 10.0 
5 L7 Bus 3 Bus 5 0.71000 8.33333 0.00114 10.0 
6 L8 Bus 4 Bus 5 0.71000 8.33333 0.00114 10.0 
7 L9 Bus 5 Bus 6 0.71000 8.33333 0.00114 10.0 
8 L10 Bus 1 Bus 7 0.48000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
9 L11 Bus 1 Bus 8 0.48000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
10 L12 Bus 1 Bus 9 0.12000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
11 L13 Bus 1 Bus 10 0.24000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
12 L14 Bus 2 Bus 11 0.06000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
13 L15 Bus 2 Bus 12 0.06000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
14 L16 Bus 2 Bus 13 0.48000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
15 L17 Bus 2 Bus 14 0.48000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
16 L18 Bus 2 Bus 15 0.48000 11.91900 0.00175 768.0 
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Appendix B. Basic data for the IEEE-RTS  
 
This Appendix gives details about the IEEE-RTS (Figure 3.16) data (Table B-1 
to B-3) and the load curve data (Tables B-4 to B-6). The IEEE-RTS transmission line 
data have been modified to exclude the bus bar failures. The load point transformer data 
is shown in Table B-7. 
 
Table B-1: Generation data for the IEEE-RTS 
 
Bus 
No. 
Capacity 
(p.u) 
 
Forced 
Outage Rate 
MTTR 
(Hrs) 
25 0.20 0.09825 44.26 
26 0.20 0.09825 44.26 
27 0.76 0.01825 35.92 
28 0.76 0.01825 35.92 
30 0.20 0.09825 44.26 
31 0.20 0.09825 44.26 
32 0.76 0.01825 35.92 
33 0.76 0.01825 35.92 
33 1.00 0.03825 46.02 
40 1.00 0.03825 46.02 
41 1.00 0.03825 46.02 
42 1.97 0.03825 45.93 
46 1.97 0.04825 45.93 
47 1.97 45.9300 45.93 
48 0.12 45.9300 54.01 
52 0.12 54.0100 54.01 
53 0.12 54.0100 54.01 
54 0.12 54.0100 54.01 
55 0.12 54.0100 54.01 
56 0.12 54.0100 36.80 
57 1.55 36.8000 36.80 
58 1.55 36.8000 130.40 
60 4.00 130.4000 130.40 
64 4.00 130.4000 20.00 
65 0.50 20.0000 20.00 
65 0.50 20.0000 20.00 
66 0.50 20.0000 20.00 
66 0.50 20.0000 20.00 
67 0.50 20.0000 20.00 
67 0.50 20.0000 36.80 
68 1.55 36.8000 36.80 
69 1.55 36.8000 90.22 
70 3.50 90.2200 44.26 
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Table B-2: Transmission line or transformer data for the IEEE-RTS 
 
No. ID From To Capacity (p.u) 
1/Reactance 
(p.u) FOR 
MTTR 
(Hrs) 
1 L01 BUS001 BUS002 1.75 71.9424 0.00032 15.13 
2 L02 BUS001 BUS003 1.75 4.7348 0.00047 8.93 
3 L03 BUS001 BUS005 1.75 11.8343 0.00026 8.24 
4 L04 BUS002 BUS004 1.75 7.8926 0.00033 8.55 
5 L05 BUS002 BUS006 1.75 5.2083 0.00043 8.86 
6 L06 BUS003 BUS009 1.75 8.4033 0.00032 8.51 
7 L07 BUS003 BUS024 4.00 11.9189 0.00175 768.0 
8 L08 BUS004 BUS009 1.75 9.6432 0.00029 8.41 
9 L09 BUS005 BUS010 1.75 11.3250 0.00027 8.30 
10 L10 BUS006 BUS010 1.75 16.5289 0.0012 38.13 
11 L11 BUS007 BUS008 1.75 16.2866 0.00023 8.02 
12 L12 BUS008 BUS009 1.75 6.0569 0.00039 8.74 
13 L13 BUS008 BUS010 1.75 6.0569 0.00039 8.74 
14 L14 BUS009 BUS011 4.00 11.9189 0.00175 768.0 
15 L15 BUS009 BUS012 4.00 11.9189 0.00175 768.0 
16 L16 BUS010 BUS011 4.00 11.9189 0.00175 768.0 
17 L17 BUS010 BUS012 4.00 11.91895 0.00175 768.0 
18 L18 BUS011 BUS013 5.00 21.0084 0.00044 10.77 
19 L19 BUS011 BUS014 5.00 23.9234 0.00043 10.76 
20 L20 BUS012 BUS013 5.00 21.0084 0.00044 10.77 
21 L21 BUS012 BUS023 5.00 10.3519 0.00059 10.82 
22 L22 BUS013 BUS023 5.00 11.5606 0.00055 10.81 
23 L23 BUS014 BUS016 5.00 25.7069 0.00041 10.75 
24 L24 BUS015 BUS016 5.00 57.8034 0.00035 10.71 
25 L25 BUS015 BUS021 5.00 20.4081 0.00045 10.77 
26 L26 BUS015 BUS021 5.00 20.4081 0.00045 10.77 
27 L27 BUS015 BUS024 5.00 19.2678 0.00045 10.77 
28 L28 BUS016 BUS017 5.00 38.6100 0.00038 10.73 
29 L29 BUS016 BUS019 5.00 43.2900 0.00036 10.72 
30 L30 BUS017 BUS018 5.00 69.4444 0.00034 10.70 
31 L31 BUS017 BUS022 5.00 9.49668 0.00062 10.83 
31 L32 BUS018 BUS021 5.00 38.6100 0.00038 10.73 
32 L33 BUS018 BUS021 5.00 38.6100 0.00038 10.73 
32 L34 BUS019 BUS020 5.00 25.2525 0.00041 10.75 
33 L35 BUS019 BUS020 5.00 25.2525 0.00041 10.75 
33 L36 BUS020 BUS023 5.00 46.2963 0.00036 10.72 
34 L37 BUS020 BUS023 5.00 46.2963 0.00036 10.72 
35 L38 BUS021 BUS022 5.00 14.74926 0.0005 10.79 
36 L39 BUS001 BUS025 0.20 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
37 L40 BUS001 BUS026 0.20 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
38 L41 BUS001 BUS027 0.76 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
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Table B-2 (continued): Transmission line or transformer data for the IEEE-RTS  
 
No. ID From To Capacity (p.u) 
1/Reactance 
(p.u) FOR 
MTTR 
(Hrs) 
39 L42 BUS001 BUS028 0.76 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
40 L43 BUS001 BUS029 1.08 11.9190 0 0 
41 L44 BUS002 BUS030 0.20 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
50 L45 BUS002 BUS031 0.20 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
51 L46 BUS002 BUS032 0.76 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
59 L47 BUS002 BUS033 0.76 11.9190 0.00175 768.0 
61 L48 BUS002 BUS034 0.97 11.9190 0 0 
62 L49 BUS003 BUS035 1.80 11.9190 0 0 
63 L50 BUS004 BUS036 0.74 11.9190 0 0 
 
 
 
Table B-3: Load bus data for the IEEE-RTS 
 
Bus no. Priority Code 
Load 
(p.u) 
29 8021 1.08 
34 1013 0.97 
35 2014 1.8 
36 6019 0.74 
37 7020 0.71 
38 5018 1.36 
39 4017 1.25 
43 3016 1.71 
44 1005 1.75 
45 1012 1.95 
49 2015 2.65 
50 1008 1.94 
51 1007 3.17 
59 1009 1 
61 1011 3.33 
62 1004 1.81 
63 1010 1.28 
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Table B-4: Weekly peak load data for the IEEE-RTS and the RBTS in percentage of the  
                    annual peak     
 
Week Peak Load Week 
Peak 
Load Week 
Peak 
Load Week 
Peak 
Load 
1 86.2 14 75.0 27 75.5 40 72.4 
2 90.0 15 72.1 28 81.6 41 74.3 
3 87.8 16 80.0 29 80.1 42 74.4 
4 83.4 17 75.4 30 88.0 43 80.0 
5 88.0 18 83.7 31 72.2 44 88.1 
6 84.1 19 87.0 32 77.6 45 88.5 
7 83.2 20 88.0 33 80.0 46 90.9 
8 80.6 21 85.6 34 72.9 47 94.0 
9 74.0 22 81.1 35 72.6 48 89.0 
10 73.7 23 90.0 36 70.5 49 94.2 
11 71.5 24 88.7 37 78.0 50 97.0 
12 72.7 25 89.6 38 69.5 51 100.0 
13 70.4 26 86.1 39 72.4 52 95.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B-5: Daily peak load data for the IEEE-RTS and the RBTS in percent of the  
                   weekly peak 
 
Day Peak Load 
Monday 93 
Tuesday 100 
Wednesday 98 
Thursday 96 
Friday 94 
Saturday 77 
Sunday 75 
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Table B-6: Hourly peak load in percentage of daily peak 
(For the IEEE-RTS and the RBTS) 
 
Winter Weeks 
1-8 & 44-52 
Summer Weeks 
18-30 
Spring/Fall Weeks 
9-17 & 31-43 Hour 
Week day Week end Week day Week end Week day Week end 
12-1 am 67 78 64 74 63 75 
1-2 63 72 60 70 62 73 
2-3 60 68 58 66 60 69 
3-4 59 66 53 65 58 66 
4-5 59 64 53 64 59 65 
5-6 60 65 58 62 65 65 
6-7 74 66 64 62 72 68 
7-8 86 70 76 66 85 74 
8-9 95 80 87 81 95 83 
9-10 96 88 85 86 99 89 
10-11 96 90 99 91 100 92 
11-Noon 85 91 100 93 99 94 
Noon-1pm 85 90 99 93 93 91 
1-2 85 88 100 92 92 90 
2-3 93 87 100 91 90 90 
3-4 94 87 97 919 88 86 
4-5 99 91 96 92 90 85 
5-6 100 100 96 94 92 88 
6-7 100 99 93 95 96 92 
7-8 96 97 92 95 98 100 
8-9 91 94 92 100 96 97 
9-10 83 92 93 93 90 95 
10-11 73 87 87 88 80 90 
11-12 63 81 72 80 70 85 
 
 
Table B-7: Load point transformer failure data 
 
Failure rate (f/yr) 0.02  
Outage duration (hr) 768 
Switching time (hr) 1 
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Appendix C. RBTS with load point transformers and stations 
The effects of including load point transformers with stations on the IEEE-RTS 
load bus and system indices are shown in the next sections.  
 
RBTS with ring bus schemes: 
 
Table C.1.1: Load bus indices  
(RBTS with ring bus schemes and load point tranformers) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00178 0.24899 3.185 0.02275 199.25 Bus 16 
17 0.00199 0.37074 15.542 0.10002 876.22 Bus 17 
18 0.00182 0.26481 6.756 0.04645 406.94 Bus 18 
19 0.00177 0.26546 3.385 0.02269 198.76 Bus 19 
20 0.00316 1.59110 20.221 0.04026 352.65 Bus 20 
 
 
Table C.1.2: System indices (RBTS with ring bus schemes and load point tranformers) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.72 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 33.76 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 91.71 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.01047 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.23217 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 2033.81 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 8989.42 
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.26535 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 10.99 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
18.07 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00125 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 659.61 
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RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes 
 
Table C.2.1: Load bus indices  
(RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes and load point transformers) 
 
No. 
Bus PLC 
ENLC 
(1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00175 0.24018 3.072 0.00000 196.62 Bus 16 
17 0.00197 0.36184 15.085 0.00212 865.93 Bus 17 
18 0.00178 0.25364 6.470 0.00000 399.65 Bus 18 
19 0.00175 0.25599 3.263 0.00003 195.79 Bus 19 
20 0.00301 1.47797 18.783 0.01536 336.38  Bus 20 
 
 
Table C.2.2: System indices  
(RBTS with double bus double breaker schemes and load point transformers) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.57 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 34.88 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 89.55 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.01022 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.22767 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 1994.36 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 8815.08                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.25230 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 10.78 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 18.179 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00123 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 646.82 
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RBTS with one and half breaker schemes 
Table C.3.1: Load bus indices  
(RBTS with one and one half breaker schemes and load point transformers) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00175 0.22947 2.935 0.02240 196.22 Bus 16 
17 0.00197 0.35059 14.491 0.09880 865.45 Bus 17 
18 0.00178 0.24286 6.195 0.04558 399.32 Bus 18 
19 0.00175 0.24512 3.124 0.02232 195.56 Bus 19 
20 0.00301 1.44664 18.384 0.03832 335.71 Bus 20 
 
Table C.3.2: System indices  
(RBTS with one and one half breaker schemes and load point transformers) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.49 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 35.87 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 89.42 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.01021 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.22743 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 1992.26 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 8805.79                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.24394 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 10.77 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 
18.10 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00123 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 646.14 
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RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes 
 
Table C.4.1: Load bus indices  
(RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes and load point transformers ) 
 
No. Bus PLC ENLC (1/yr) 
ELC 
(MW/yr) 
EDNS 
(MW) 
EENS 
(MWhrs/yr) 
Bus 
name 
16 0.00175 0.22012 2.816 0.02240 196.22 Bus 16 
17 0.00197 0.36081 15.042 0.09885 865.93 Bus 17 
18 0.00178 0.25296 6.453 0.04562 399.65 Bus 18 
19 0.00175 0.23612 3.009 0.02235 195.785 Bus 19 
20 0.00301 1.44613 18.377 0.03837 336.16  Bus 20 
 
 
 
Table C.4.2: System indices  
(RBTS with one and one third breaker schemes and load point transformers) 
 
System Indices/Units  
Expected number of load curtailments (1/ year) ENLC 2.49 
Average duration of load curtailment (hrs/disturbance) ADLC 35.87603 
Expected duration of load curtailment (Hrs / year) EDLC 89.50 
Probability of load curtailments (PLC) 0.01022 
Expected demand not supplied (MW) EDNS 0.22760 
Expected energy not supplied (MWhr / year) EENS 1993.75 
Expected Damage Cost (K$/ year) EDC 8812.36                    
Bulk Power-interruption Index (MW/MW- year) BPII 0.24701 
Bulk Power/energy Curtailment Index (MWhr /MW- year) BECI 10.78 
Bulk Power-supply average MW curtailment Index  
(MW/disturbance) BPACI 18.32 
Modified Bulk/energy curtailment Index (MW/MW) MBECI 0.00123 
Severity Index (system minutes/ year) SI 646.62 
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Appendix D. IEEE-RTS station configurations 
The 24 station configurations shown in this section are with transformer at the load 
point. The same configurations are used for studies without load point transformers. 
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Figure D-1: Bus #1 (load bus 29) 
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Figure D-7: Bus#7 (load bus 43) 
Figure D-8: Bus#8 (load bus 44) 
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Figure D-9: Bus#9 (load bus 45) 
Figure D-10: Bus#10 (load bus 49) 
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Figure D-11: Bus#11  
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Figure D-13: Bus#13 (load bus 50) 
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Figure D-14: Bus#14 (load bus 51) 
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Figure D-15: Bus#15 (load bus 59) 
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Figure D-16: Bus#16 (load bus 61) 
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Figure D-18: Bus#18 
                       (load bus 61) 
 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
#19 
L34 
  
CB123 
Load 
CB122 
CB127 
CB126 
CB125 
CB124 
BB080 
BB081 BB082 
BB083 
BB084 
BB085 
L35 
L29 
  
L76 
  
  
#20 
  
  
  
  
BB088 
  
  
L37 
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
CB130 
Load 
CB128 
CB131 
CB129 
L34 
L35 
L36 
BB090 
BB091 
BB089 
CB180 
BB901 
L77 
Figure D-19: Bus#19 (load bus 62) 
Figure D-20: Bus#20 (load bus 63) 
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Figure D-21: Bus#21 
Figure D-22: Bus#22 
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Figure D-24: Bus#24 
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Appendix E. Modified stations 
 
Figures E-1 and E-2 show the modified stations for buses 19  and 3 in the IEEE-RTS 
respectively. 
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Figure E-1: Modified Bus#19 (load bus 62) 
Figure E-2: Modified Bus#3 (load bus 35) 
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Appendix F. Equations for a second order minimal cut set 
 
The failure rate, the repair time and the unavailability for a second order minimal cut set 
are calculated using Equations F.1 to F.3. It is assumed, that λ1 r1 and λ2 r2 are 
numerically very small [38]. 
 
λs = λ1λ2 (r1 + r2)        (F.1) 
 
Us = λ1λ2 r1 r2         (F.2) 
 
rs  = Us                           (F.3) 
       λs 
Where, 
λs – Failure rate of a second order minimal cut set (f/yr) 
λ1 – Failure rate of a component 1 (f/yr) 
λ2 – Failure rate of a component 2 (f/yr) 
r1  – Repair time of a component 1 (yr) 
r2  – Repair time of a component 2 (yr) 
Us – Unavailability for a second order minimal cut set 
 
Equations for higher order minimal cut sets are given in [38]. 
  
  
  
      
      
    
  
  
  
  
   
     
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
